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Article
From Babel to Reason: An Examination of the Duty Issue
James R. Adams*
It is all a question of expediency,... offair judgment, always keeping in
mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be
practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Our handling of negligence cases has created decisions that resemble
products of the Tower of Babel.2 To change this, we must eliminate the loose
analysis that plagues many of our courts. In addition, we must refine our
understanding of the "duty" element of a prima facie negligence case.
As Christopher Columbus Langdell wrote more than a hundred years ago,
judicial opinions are "useless or worse than useless for any purpose of systematic
2. See Genesis 11:4-9, an account of humankind that teaches that the whole earth had but one language.
The Lord concluded that the people could do whatever they set out to do, and they built a tower to the
heavens-the Tower of Babel. The Lord's response was to confuse their language so that they could not
understand one another's speech. When He did so, the people scattered all over the face of the earth and ceased
building the City of Babel. Similar lingual confusion exists in negligence law.
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study."' Arguably, today's judicial opinions are worse; they are too long and many
lack any evidence of reasoning.4 Conclusive answers to misidentified issues do not
provide lawyers and trial judges with helpful literature. Furthermore, the common
use of labels such as "foreseeable" and "proximate cause" when dealing with the
duty issue must stop. Reason, not labels, should reign when courts decide duty
questions.
Judicial opinions that venture beyond the disputed issues in a case create
"Babel." Too often, non-issues are probed at length. In addition, many decisions are
laced with lengthy lists of citations in an apparent effort to strengthen the
conclusive answers given by the court. Many appellate courts retreat to Babel when
given an opportunity to clarify negligence law. Langdell was correct; most judicial
opinions are useless.
The opening parts of this Article address two concerns: (1) the need to
accurately identify the issues in each negligence case; and (2) when duty is an issue,
to clarify the duty concept.5 Following these discussions, a proposed analysis of the
duty question will be described.6 Finally, the proposed analysis will be applied to
a few popular decisions.7
II. ISSUE IDENTIFICATION
Lawyers, judges, and insurance companies long for fairness, effectiveness, and
certainty in tort law. Fairness and effectiveness are certainly achievable; however,
an overriding concern regarding the lack of certainty and the unpredictability of tort
law still exists. This uncertainty fosters unnecessary litigation, and may create a
sense of injustice in negligence law.8 The author submits that the precise
identification of issues in negligence cases, followed by a more structured analysis
of the duty question, will reduce the existing uncertainty that clouds even the best
3. C.C. LANGDELL, CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at vi (1871).
4. It seems that some author-judges may be seeking "seminal status" or at least a place in the hearts of
law students by gaining a spot in a professor's casebook or other tenure-driven publication. For one such egregious
attempt, see Fazzolari v. Portland School District, 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987).
5. Infra Parts II-III; see Fazzolari, 734 P.2d at 1327-32 (illustrating one such attempt).
6. See infra Part IV (proposing an analysis of the duty question).
7. See infra Part V (applying the proposed analysis detailed in Part IV to several cases).
8. See WARREN A. SEAvEY, CoGrrAnTONS ON ToRS 67 (1954).
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of today's judicial decisions.9 The achievement of these goals will provide a stable
foundation for the discussion of tort reform.10
A. Basic Elements in the World of Negligence
Our discussion is confined to negligence actions." Negligence actions consist
of four elements. The duty element is for the judge; it is a question of law that must
be resolved before trial.' 2 For the plaintiff to recover, the defendant must have a
duty to the plaintiff with regard to plaintiffs harm.' 3 In addition, the plaintiff must
allege and establish the defendant's negligence or breach of the duty.'4 Next, the
plaintiff must allege and prove a causal connection between the claimed negligence,
or breach, and the plaintiff's harm. Finally, the plaintiff must allege and prove the
damages sustained.
Our first concern is the failure of many lawyers and judges to accurately
distinguish these elements when resolving negligence cases. It is very important
that lawyers and judges recognize that each element of a negligence case is separate
and distinct from the other elements. Unfortunately, even highly regarded courts
have failed to distinguish or identify the actual issue or issues in cases before them.
9. A frequently encountered reminder of this confusion appears whenever the test of "foresecability" is
encountered in discussions of duty. Even though most courts seem to rely heavily on the term "foreseeability"
when resolving a duty question, it should be clear that foreseeability is not useful in that context. The word means
to see beforehand, to divine, or to predict. Courts consider foreseeability when describing the degree of risk that
given conduct may involve (e.g., it is foreseeable that shooting a gun in a crowded room will cause serious bodily
harm, but that shooting a gun in a desert does not create a substantial risk of such harm). In other words,
"foresceability" reflects the ordinary person's understanding of the magnitude of risk that accompanies described
conduct.
Harm may or may not be "foreseeable." In many cases, there is no real dispute as to the degree of risk, but
in other cases, the degree of risk is debatable. The degree of risk is quite relevant when the court is faced with
either a breach or a cause/substantial factor question, but it is certainly not useful when a duty question exists.
10. What problems exist in the eyes of tort reformers? They include the need to eliminate, or at least
curtail, joint and several liability, the claimed need for "caps" on damages, and the creation of special immunities
from tort liability. See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999) (exemplifying one such
"cap"). The unpredictability inherent in many court decisions interferes with the workability of our tort system,
and thus lends support to those seeking reform. See generally Christopher T. Stidvent, Note, Tort Reform in
Alaska: Much Ado About Nothing?, 16 ALAsKA L. REv. 61 (1999) (discussing one state's extensive tort reform).
11. This Article's discussion will not explore intentional torts or strict liability.
12. An example of this is a motion to dismiss. In federal court, this would be a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
13. The three elements involving fact questions are assumed to be established when we discuss duty. We
are not concerned with defenses to established prima facie cases; we are primarily concerned with defining the
limits on liability when the "duty question" has been raised.
14. Selection of the controlling standard of conduct is also a question of law for the court deciding the duty
issue. Usually, one has a duty to exercise ordinary care. However, in some instances, the controlling standard is
less demanding; simple negligence will not be enough to trigger liability. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696
(Cal. 1992) (involving participants in a touch football game who were subject to liability only on a showing of
reckless misconduct). In other instances, a high degree of care is required. The "dangerous instrument" decision,
Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1998), is an example, and will be examined in Part V.C.
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This Article will provide examples to illustrate this situation.t5 The following
diagram illustrates the elements in a typical negligence case:
ttig to first base presents a question
of law; rounding second and third, as well
as scoring, usually raises questions of fact.
DAMAGES
As used in this Article, the word "duty" simply identifies the scope of a
negligent person's legal responsibility. As stated above,1 6 the duty question is one
of law; it is for the court. When a duty question exists, the issue should be raised
before trial. t7 Usually, negligence ("breach" herein), cause, and damage questions
are questions of fact for the jury, under proper instructions from the court. t8
By carefully distinguishing the elements of the negligence action, lawyers and
judges can determine whether a case is "going to the jury" or, rather, presents a duty
question that must be resolved by the court before trial. Both efficiency and
'predictability will be enhanced by clearly distinguishing the issues in each
negligence case.
Much of the trouble we have in defining duty is created by judicial opinions
that have confused the issue or issues before the court. t9 Often, many pages of a
15. See infra Parts I, V (giving examples of cases wherein courts have attempted to successfully identify
issues placed before them).
16. Supra text accompanying note 12.
17. This is usually done by a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (formulating the federal
system's motion-to-dismiss requirements). Some use a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P.
56 (providing the summary judgment rules for use in federal courts).
18. As stated, the damage question is for the jury. However, the nature of the harm, whether physical,
emotional, or economic, is important when deciding the duty question.
19. The English courts are not quite as prone to commit this sin, but their opinions in duty cases will not
escape our criticism. We will examine a few examples as we proceed. One example will be Marc Rich & Co. v.
Bishop Rock Marine, Co., also known as The Nicholas H, 3 All E.R. 307 (1994), which will be discussed below
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decision purportedly solving a duty question will discuss evidence relevant to the
foreseeability of the event, causation, or the nature and extent of the plaintiffs
harm. In such cases there may have been breach, cause, or damage questions, but
there was no duty question. The jury's findings of fact are final; there is no need to
discuss such proof on appeal unless the insufficiency of admissible evidence or
instructional errors are claimed.
B. Significant Examples of Weakened Analysis
1. The Magic Mountain Mess
A recent example of such mellow-sounding, yet misleading, decisions is
Robison v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc. (Magic Mountain).20 In this case, an out-of-
control, negligently operated automobile left the paved portion of a large parking
lot at the defendant's amusement park, and entered an adjacent unprotected, 21
rectangular-shaped, grass-covered picnic area.Y The automobile struck the
plaintiffs, who were sitting at one of defendant's picnic tables.23 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant park operator was negligent in the design, maintenance,
and operation of its parking lot-picnic area.24
Strangely, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that this
accident was not foreseeable-presumably questioning whether a duty existed at
all. Admittedly, the facts were unique, but what were the issues in the case? The
appellate court's opinion describes the event as follows:
[The car was owned by a 21[-]year-old man. Its starter motor was
defective, and the car-which had a standard rather than automatic
transmission-had to be push-started. The man drove this car to Magic
Mountain and parked about 300 yards from the picnic area. With him was
his female friend: a 41-year-old, developmentally disabled woman who
received Social Security disability benefits as a "slow learner." The woman
had never driven a car, and did not know how to drive a car. Hence[,] when
the time came for the couple to push-start the car in order to leave Magic
Mountain, the woman pushed the car in the direction of the picnic table
while the man tried to start it by operating the clutch and gas pedal. Despite
several attempts, the car would not start, apparently because the woman
at Part V.A.
20. Robison v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1294, 1296 (1998).
21. No curbing, fence, or rail separated the paved parking lot from the grassy picnic area-there was not
even a warning sign. Robison, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 1297.
22. MdL
23. Id
24. mL at 1296.
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was unable to push the car to a sufficient speed. How close to the picnic
area the car had been pushed by the woman is not revealed in the record,
although the evidence does suggest that neither the man nor the woman was
aware that there was a picnic area at the end of their parking lane. Even
though the woman had never before driven a car and did not know how to
drive a car, the woman then assumed the driver's position, seated at the
steering wheel, while the man pushed. The woman apparently operated the
clutch and gas pedals according to instructions, because the motor started
on her first attempt. However, not being a driver, she then did not know
how to control the car, apparently panicked, and did nothing. The car
consequently proceeded down the parking lane while the man ran behind[,]
shouting driving instructions without effect. The car continued directly
over the "stop" painted on the pavement, traversed the 40 feet of grass, and
hit the picnic table at a speed variously estimated at 25 to 40 miles per
hour. 25
Most will admit that this invasion of the picnic area was surprising; it would be
"unforeseeable" in the eyes of the defendant and the lower court judge. It was
undisputed that no other car had driven into the picnic area before-even though
nothing but the common sense of motorists would keep them from doing so. The
lack of foreseeability would support the argument that there was no breach, but
does the low probability mean that there was no duty?
Unfortunately, the trial court granted defendant's summary judgment motion,
holding that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiffs because the accident itself
was unforeseeable.26 The court was impressed by the fact that no similar incident
had previously occurred. 7 The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding
that the lack of prior similar incidents was not a sufficient basis for summary
judgment."
This ruling was correct if it is assumed that the court was thinking about the
breach question; there was ajury question on breach. However, the language of the
decision indicates the court was tackling the duty question. The record shows that
the defendant distributed an informational brochure indicating that this picnic area
was one of the "guest services" provided at Magic Mountain.29 Under California
law, there is no doubt that the owner or occupier of land owes a duty to exercise
25. md. at 1298.
26. md. at 1296.
27. See Thomas, supra note 20, at 8 (comparing Magic Mountain with Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping
Center, 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1983), which holds that, absent "prior similar incidents" a property owner has no duty
to provide on-premises security guards to protect others on the property from third parties' criminal acts). Ann M.
is another "breach" case often misread as a duty decision.
28. Robison, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 1305.
29. Id. at 1297.
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ordinary care toward on-site business invitees.3 ° The only question in Magic
Mountain was breach: was the defendant-owner negligent in not providing a barrier
of some sort around this picnic area. The court correctly stated that conduct is
negligent where some unreasonable risk of danger would have been foreseen by a
reasonable person.31
However, the confusion arises from other language. The court opened its
discussion by stating that the negligent defendant "thus had a duty to take
reasonable measures to protect plaintiffs. 32 In part, the court stated:
Magic Mountain obtained summary judgment on the theory that Magic
Mountain had no duty to protect plaintiffs from such an accident because
the accident was unforeseeable, primarily because no similar incident had
previously occurred. However, even though no similar incident had
previously occurred, the danger was apparent in view of the configuration
of the parking lot and picnic area. Magic Mountain thus had a duty to take
reasonable measures to protect plaintiff against such an accident
notwithstanding the absence of prior similar incidents. The record could
support a finding that Magic Mountain failed to take reasonable protective
measures, and the summary judgment will therefore be reversed. 33
This paragraph is ambiguous. The first three sentences seem to reaffirm the
commonly recited rule that if harm is foreseeable, then there is a duty to exercise
ordinary care. The fourth sentence is the critical sentence in light of the evidence;
the court expressly stated that Magic Mountain may have been negligent.
Foreseeability of the event was a question for the jury on this breach issue.
The adjudicative facts were not in doubt. Under these facts, Magic Mountain
would argue that the absence of prior invasions of the area indicates there was no
negligence on its part. The plaintiffs would argue that the absence of barriers
created a very dangerous situation. These fact-supported arguments would create
a question of breach for the jury. The lawyers' apparent concern regarding
30. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561,564 (Cal. 1968) (citing California case law which states: "All
persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as a result of their conduct.").
31. Robison, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 1296.
32. Il (emphasis added).
33. 1& (emphasis added). Note that, in the court's footnote 2, the court correctly distinguishes the cause
issue from the duty question. Id at 1302.
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foreseeability's importance to the duty issue was unnecessary and misleading.34 The
facts presented a simple question of breach for the jury.
When the facts are analyzed, it is almost certain the plaintiffs would "get to the
jury." If the jury was not impressed with the plaintiffs' argument of neglect, then
the verdict, if any, would be quite low. On the other hand, if the jury believed that
this picnic area was an area just waiting for an accident to happen, the defendant
could face a sizable judgment. Pre-trial, "legal horse-trading" was called for, rather
than a motion for summary judgment. As it was, the lawyers, the trial judge, and the
Court of Appeal mistakenly jumped into the mysteries of duty, wasting valuable
time and talent. Such procedures do little to improve the lay-persons' view of our
tort system.
2. The Kline Confusion
This failure to identify issues is not limited to California's lawyers and judges.
An oft-cited federal circuit court decision from the District of Columbia is another
example of this "sand-in-the-eyes" defense. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue
Apartment Corp. was an action by a tenant who was criminally assaulted in the
hallway of the defendant corporation's apartment house.36 The federal district court
had held that the defendant landlord did not owe a duty to the plaintiff.37 Judgment
for the corporate landlord was entered, even though it is self-evident that there was
no question about the defendant landlord's duty to the plaintiff-tenant for injury in
a common area.
38
The tenant successfully appealed; the court of appeals held there was a duty
and, under the circumstances, remanded the case to the district court for the
determination of damages.39 The undisputed evidence that the landlord had notice
both that tenants might be exposed to crimes against their persons in the common
areas and that the apartment building was undergoing a rising tide of crime
established as a matter of law that the defendant landlord had breached its duty.
40
34. Judge Zebrowski's second paragraph set the tone: "['E]ven though no similar incident had previously
occurred, the danger was apparent .... Magic Mountain thus had a duty to take reasonable measures to protect
plaintiffs ..... "d. at 1296. Reading on, the duty question continues to be the focus of the opinion. The court
thoroughly discussed the Ann M., Bigbee v. Pacific Tel & Tel Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49 (1983), and Alcaraz v. Vee, 14
Cal. 4th 1149 (1997), decisions. Id at 1295-1305. Did any of these California Supreme Court decisions involve
a duty question? The answer is, simply, "no."
35. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).




40. The court of appeals found that the applicable standard of care was the standard that the landlord
himself was employing at the time the plaintiff had become a resident on the premises. Id. at 486. Having failed
to meet this standard, the landlord was liable as a matter of law for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. laL at 486-
87.
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Even though there was no question that the defendant landlord owed plaintiff,
one of its tenants, a duty to exercise ordinary care with regard to the safety of
common areas, the majority in Kline discussed the question of the landlord's duty.4 1
Not until later in the opinion does the court discuss the applicable standard of care.42
On reflection, most should agree that the duty discussion was uncalled for, as it was
not necessary. Even the court wrote:
It has long been well settled in this jurisdiction that, where a landlord
leases separate portions of property and reserves under his own control the
halls, stairs, or other parts of the property for use in common by all tenants,
he has a duty to all those on the premises of legal right to use ordinary care
and diligence to maintain the retained parts in a reasonably safe condition.43
Breach, causation, and damages are often issues in such tenant-landlord cases.
In Kline, evidence of criminal action on the premises was relevant; did the
defendant take necessary precautions? In addition. even though an unknown third
party inflicted the harm, was the third party's criminal conduct a superseding cause
relieving the negligent landlord of legal responsibility?" This question is usually
for the jury.45
C. Summary of Issue Identification
The real issues in Magic Mountain and Kline were questions of fact. As these
decisions demonstrate, carefully distinguishing cause and breach questions from the
duty question can reduce litigation time and costs. Fact questions are the trial
lawyer's daily grist. With experience, the answers to such questions are rather easy.
When the evidence of breach is disputed, the question will be for the jury. When the
evidence of breach points in but one direction, the question may be resolved by the
trial judge as a matter of law.
So it is with causation. Usually, cause is not an issue; the defendant's conduct
either was or was not a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm.
Howeve, when the relevant evidence concerning legal causation is in conflict, such
as when the case involves multiple tortfeasors, the cause question is for the jury.46
41. Id. at 480-85.
42. 1d. at 485-88.
43. Id at 481 (emphasis added).
44. As the Kline Court noted, often the act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is
a superseding cause of the harm to the tenant. Id. at 481. Whether this question is available as a defense to liability
depends on whether the third party's act was foreseeable (in a probability sense). Id. at 483. If the third party's
criminal act was foreseeable, then the criminal act was not a superseding cause. Id.
45. See id. at 488 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (questioning why the case was not submitted to the jury).
46. See, e.g., Ludwig v. City of San Diego, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1105 (1998) (deciding yet another misleading
case).
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Lawyers know that settlement discussions are quite urgent when jury questions
are presented. Even the best trial lawyers understand the risks posed by the
prediction of an unknown jury's reaction to a given set of facts. Faced with such
risks, serious settlement discussions should produce a compromise of some sort.
Accordingly, there is no need for a trial in most negligence cases.
III. THE DUTY ISSUE: EXISTING DEFINITIONS
When a question of duty is present, pretrial motions should precisely develop
the reasons for and against the imposition of a duty on the defendant to a particular
plaintiff. True lawyering, rather than horse-trading, takes over. In such cases,
agreement as to what a court must know when resolving the duty issue would be
most beneficial. On the duty question, the judge's mind, rather than a juror's
reaction, becomes the target of the lawyers' work.
That today's courts do not agree on how to set the limits of a negligent
defendant's legal liability is clear.47 There are no precise rules, definitions, or
analytical guidelines for lawyers and judges to use. In fact, finding agreement on
even basic principles is difficult.48 Resolving the duty question can be difficult
under either existing or proposed rules.
Although many highly qualified persons have written on this subject,49 more
must be said. All the ranting and raving about "proximate cause," "foreseeability,"
and "duty" has not improved the clarity of negligence law.5° It is as if we still labor
in Babel.5'
We open our discussion with commonly accepted definitions of duty. Some
definitions of duty seem useless; all existing definitions of duty lack precision.
Below, this Article will describe a proposed analysis,52 and then it will apply this
47. The emotional distress and economic loss cases are obvious examples. Jurisdictions do not agree on
the nature and extent of a negligent person's legal obligation when the plaintiff's only harm is emotional or
economic. Fortunately, the duty question has been settled in most instances of physical harm. Magic Mountain
and Kline are examples; therein, no real dispute existed regarding the defendants' duty to those respective
plaintiffs. Breach and causation questions are common.
48. 1 have urged greater analytical precision when attacking the duty question before. See James R. Adams,
Proximate Cause Is Too Remote, 17 S.D. L. REV. 316 (1972) (arguing that questions regarding duty should be
more carefully inspected). Not much has changed! The need for predictability is greater now; hence, this renewed
plea. At least one court, that of Fazzolari v. Portland School District, 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987), has tried.
49. Dean Green is the pioneer. See a collection of his articles in LEON GREEN, THE LmGATION PROCESS
IN TORT LAW (2d ed. 1965). He has been joined by E. Wayne Thode, TortAnalysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause
and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1. Additional information
can be found in W. PAcE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86 (5th ed. 1984).
50. Even the California Legislature uses "proximate cause" in mysterious ways. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1999) (regarding the sale of liquor to intoxicated persons, and attempting to limit the
"proximate cause" of injuries caused by such persons); CAL CIV. CODE § 1714.4 (West 1999) (attempting to use
"proximate cause" to limit liability in cases of firearm or ammunition design).
51. See Genesis 11:4-9 (telling the story of Babel).
52. Infra Part IV.
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analysis to some controversial decisions. 3 We will be quite practical; the task of
labeling and theorizing is best left to legal philosophers.'
A. Roman Origins and the Modem French and German Codes
The countries of Europe are often referred to as "code" states; their legal
systems are based on rather complete codes of law. The judges in these states apply
code provisions to the facts of each case. Even though the codes are quite general
in their definitions of duty, judges have established limitations through
interpretation of the language of those codes.
Both French and German negligence law can be traced to ancient Roman
Law-specifically, that portion of the Roman Law entitled Lex. Atuilia. It was the
Lex. Atuilia that served as the starting point for modem European negligence law.
The Lex. Atuilia was based on the general proposition that an action would lie for
damage done to another through fault.
The legal concept of culpa in Roman Law is traceable to the moral concept of
fault in theology where, to act culpably, in some sense one has to will or choose to
do the wrong thing. In the case of negligent wrongdoing, one could be at fault for
having undertaken the "wrong" activity if she had been performing a criminal or
excessively dangerous activity, or if she had been performing a permissible activity
in an unsafe manner. It was believed that damage was suffered when a person had
less than his just due. One example would be an injury to a person or an injury to
his relations with other persons.5 5 Of course, the culpa-the wrong-must have
been a cause of damage.
The language of the French Code provides us with a good starting point: "Any
act whatever of man which causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault
it occurred to make reparation.''16 This general provision is followed by more
specific articles. For instance, one article provides that a person is liable not only
for the damage he causes by his own act, but also for damage caused by the acts of
persons for whom he is responsible, or of things that he has under his guard. 7
The language of the French Code seems void of limitations on the legal
liability, specifically the duty, of a person whose "fault" caused harm. Will such a
person be responsible for the emotional distress suffered by an otherwise-unharmed
onlooker? The French courts seem to have worked this out.
53. Infra Part V.
54. See generally RicHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE (1990) (providing a reference
for those interested in practical jurisprudence); Judge Posner's Madison Lecture Provides an Analysis of Theory,
N.Y.U.L. SCH. MAG., Autumn 1998, at 82 (reflecting on Judge Posner's speech on constitutional theory at the
Thirty-Seventh Annual James Madison Lecture).
55. See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 555 (2d
ed. 1977).
56. C. civ. art. 1382 (France) (John H. Crabb trans., Fred. B. Rothman & Co. 1977) (emphasis added).
57. Id. art. 1384.
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The German Code is similar to the French. The German Code reads as follows:
"A person who, willfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health,
freedom, property or other right of another is bound to compensate him for any
damage arising therefrom. 5 8 As with the French Code, this general statement is
followed by more particular provisions. For instance, Section 826 provides that a
person who willfully causes damage to another in a manner contrary to good morals
is obliged to compensate the other for the damage. 9
Again, is there no limit to a violator's legal responsibility? More precisely, is
a negligent person legally obligated, and therefore under a duty, to repay one who
has suffered an economic loss because of the defendant's negligence? An example
would be the claim of a worker who suffered a loss of income when the defendant
negligently burned down her employer's plant.
Under both the French and German codes, judges must identify and then
interpret any ambiguities. Under Article 1382 of the French Code, a person who
caused damage to another would be liable if it was the person's "fault" that caused
the damage.6 This seems to mean that one cannot establish liability without making
some showing of fault. However, the French Code does contain provisions creating
strict liability.
61
This author is concerned with the extent of a negligent person's legal liability.
Duty limitations are not apparent under either of the codes herein mentioned. A
casual reading of the French Code raises the question as to the need for some
relationship between the person who has sustained the damage and the person
whose fault has caused that person's harm. The French courts have had no trouble
finding that some relationship must exist. However, judges found the word "fault"
to be ambiguous. They believed that one cannot be at fault for doing that which one
has a right to do. In other words, "fault" means conduct contrary to an existing right
of another. Therefore, one must have a relationship of some kind to the other before
the other can hold a right. Without some yet-to-be-defined relationship, the person
at fault cannot be legally liable for the other's harm.
The need for a relationship can be established in another way. The courts
recognized that each code required, in effect, that the defendant's conduct be
considered a "wrong." Negligent conduct is not liability-producing unless it
interferes with the rights of another; therefore, such conduct must be a "wrong."
Hence, under judicial interpretation of the general language of such codes, some
limitations had to be placed on a negligent person's liability. In other words, a duty
58. § 823 BGB (Germany) (emphasis added).
59. § 826 BGB (Germany).
60. C. civ. art. 1382 (France).
61. See, e.g., C. Civ. art. 1385 (France) (decrying that the owner of an animal is liable for damage done by
the animal whether the animal is under the owner's guard or whether it had strayed or escaped). Fault is not
mentioned in this provision.
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must be recognized before a negligent person can be held legally responsible for
resulting harm.
This lack of legislative precision placed a heavy burden on courts and advocates
alike.62 Interpretation was inevitable. On the positive side, it was this elasticity or
extreme generality of wording that permitted the development and growth of the
civil law. The civil law European nations' answers to specific fact situations are
quite similar to the answers developed in England and the United States.
Unfortunately, the answers are conclusive in nature; the express reasons for their
answers are seldom found.
B. The English Rule
Although England 63 has never been a "code" state, its Parliament has enacted
a number of statutes that redefine duties and standards of care in rather significant
circumstances. One such statute is the well-known Occupiers Liability Act of
1957.6 However, the common law still reigns supreme in tort cases. Under the
common law, the judicial branch "makes the law." It is the courts' determination
of the extent of a culpable person's legal responsibility to the victim that we study
here.
The English description and definition of duty has evolved rather slowly. The
changing dimension of duty can be traced from the well-known case of Heaven v.
Pender through the recent case of White v. Jones.6 Our cursory examination
makes the fact apparent that the English description of a person's duty in a
62. See Daniel J. Gifford, Communication of Legal Standards, Policy Development, and Effective Conduct
Regulation, 56 CoRNELL L. REv. 409 (1971) (explaining that the use of general language in statutes is not
necessarily bad; such lack of precision provides the courts with greater latitude in application).
63. Other countries once a part of the United Kingdom are also separated from the "codes."
64. Occupiers Liability Act of 1957,5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 31 (Eng.). This legislation did not alter an owner's
duty to one injured on her land, but it did affect the degree of care owed to such a victim.
65. 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883).
66. 2 App. Cas. 207 (1995). Although we will not discuss all of the foundational duty cases, the general
evolution follows from Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (personal injury), and its predecessor,
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842) (personal injury claim against seller); through Donoghue v.
Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562 (appeal taken from Scot.) (personal injury claim against seller); Bourhill v. Young,
1943 App. Cas. 92 (bystander's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller
& Partners, 1964 App. Cas. 465 (economic loss caused by negligent accountants); Home Office v. Dorset Yacht
Co., 1970 App. Cas. 1004 (property damage from negligent supervision); Spartan Steel andAlloys, Ltd. v. Martin
& Co. (Contractors), 1 Q.B. 27 (1972) (property damage and economic loss); Anns v. Merton London Borough
Council, 1978 App. Cas. 728 (economic loss caused by negligent public inspector); Junior Books v. Veitchi Co.,
1982 App. Cas. 250 (economic loss caused by negligent contractor); Murphy v. Brentwood District Council, 1991
App. Cas. 398 (economic loss); Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co. (The Nicholas H), 3 All E.R. 307
(1994) (loss of cargo due to neglect of inspector); and White v. Jones, 1995App. Cas. 207 (economic loss caused
by negligent solicitor).
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negligence action is still quite general in nature. Thus, the proposed analysis
described below in Part IV will be both helpful and workable in both England and
the United States.
1. Heaven v. Pender
Nineteenth century English courts, after limiting tort liability by requiring proof
of negligence in tort cases,67 further limited the legal responsibility of the negligent
defendant to "foreseeable damage. ' 68 The function of this "duty" limitation was to
more closely define circumstances in which liability for negligence may be
imposed.69
The starting point for an understanding of the duty element in England's
negligence cases was the seminal decision in Heaven v. Pender.70 The adjudicative
facts were clear. The defendant dock owner supplied and erected scaffolding to
facilitate work on a ship in the defendant's dry dock.71 The ship owner had agreed
to lease the dry dock and the scaffolding from the defendant dock owner.72 The
injured plaintiff was an employee of a ship painter who had contracted with a
shipowner to paint the ship's hull.73 It was undisputed that one of the defendant's
scaffolding ropes was defective and because of this defect the plaintiff sustained
serious injury.74 The question was whether the defendant was subject to liability to
this third party for physical harm.75 Even though privity was absent,76 the court held
that the defendant was subject to liability to the third party.
77
The guiding principle in Heaven v. Pender was the foreseeability of the harm.
In so many words, the court found that a harm is "foreseeable" when, under the
circumstances, any person possessing-and actually exercising---ordinary sense
would have recognized that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own
conduct with regard to those circumstances, he would cause injury to the person or
property of another. 8 Foreseeability of the harm set the scope of the duty.
67. Strict liability is retained in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App.
330,339-40 (1868).
68. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 512 (1883).
69. Smith v. Littlewoods Organization Ltd., 1 App. Cas. 241 (1987).





75. Id. at 507.
76. Id; see also Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
77. Heaven, 11 Q.B.D. at 514.
78. Heaven, 11 Q.B.D. at 509. Again, this statement is quite general, and it has been qualified by later
decisions.
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A comparison of this Heaven description of duty with the duty definition set
forth in California Civil Code section 171479 yields interesting results. The English
principle assumes a relationship between the victim and the alleged tortfeasor; only
when "one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to
another"80 does the general principle apply. This California Code provision, like its
European predecessor, is silent as to the need for a relationship of any kind-but
a relationship of some sort seems to be implied.8'
2. Donoghue v. Stevenson
A more recent English duty decision is Donoghue v. Stevenson.82 This decision
stresses the need for a relationship between the defendant and the injured plaintiff.
In Donoghue, the defendant bottler sold ginger beer in an opaque bottle to a
retailer.83 The retailer resold the product to a young man who bought it for a young
woman, the plaintiff.84 The bottle included both ginger beer and the decomposed
remains of a snail which had found its way into the bottle at the defendant's bottling
plant.85 The defendant relied on the "privity of contract" limitation on the duty of
a seller or manufacturer86 recognized in Winterbottom v. Wright.87 Building on
Heaven v. Pender, the House of Lords held in Donoghue that the defendant bottler
owed this third-party plaintiff a duty to take care that the bottle did not contain
foreign matter; the bottler would be liable if this duty of ordinary care were
breached.88 Lord Atkin said:
[I]n English law, there must be, and is, some general conception of
relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found
in the books are instances. The liability for negligence, whether you style
it as such or treat it as in other systems as a species of 'culpa,' is no doubt
based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the
offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code would
79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (West 1998); see id. ("Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of
his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person."); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1998) ("Every act
whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.").
80. Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562 (appeal taken from Scot.).
81. See infra Part 1I.C.2 (discussing the California roles).
82. 1932 App. Cas. 562 (appeal taken from Scot.).
83. 1d. at 566.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 568.
87. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
88. No trial of the truth of the averments ever took place. See R.F.V. Heuston, Donoghue v. Stevenson in
Retrospect, 20 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1957) (explaining that the young woman died before the truth was told as to
whether or not a snail was actually in the bottle).
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censor cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give a right to every
person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise
which limit the range of complaints and the extent of their remedy. The
rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes, in law, you must not
injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour?[,]
receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your
neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to
be-persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought
reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."
This statement described what has become known as the "neighbour principle." It
does not supply objective guidance to the judge faced with a duty question. Indeed,
who is the defendant's neighbour? Unfortunately, application of this principle is
subject to unpredictable results. Even though it remains an element in the English
definition of duty, the "neighbour principle" is no longer a complete definition.
3. Anns v. Merton London Borough and Progeny
English law followed Donoghue v. Stevenson through other factual situations
in its continuing efforts to more closely define duty. By 1978, the time of Anns v.
Merton London Borough Council,90 the English duty concept reached its most
expansive point. However, a more restrictive view reigned after the 1991 decision
in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council.9' Even though the two cases were
factually similar, in Murphy, the House of Lords took a stricter view of the scope
of the negligent wrongdoer's legal responsibility. The specific rule of Anns was
then discarded. However, a discussion of Anns and its progeny will be useful to
define the elusive concept of duty.
In Anns, Lord Wilberforce suggested that the duty question be approached in
two stages.92 First, in order to determine if a duty existed, one must ask whether a
sufficient relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant so that, in the
defendant's reasonable contemplation, carelessness on his part might cause damage
to the plaintiff. This is, in effect, the principle articulated earlier in Heaven v.
Pender and Donoghue v. Stevenson.93 Generally speaking, the first stage of the Anns
89. Donoghue, 1932 App. Cas. 562,580.
90. 1978 App. Cas. 728.
91. 1991App. Cas. 398.
92. Ans, 1978 App. Cas. at 741.
93. See supra Part IILB.1-2 (discussing these decisions).
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analysis raised the long-recognized "neighbor principle." 94 The second stage
requires judges to ask whether the imposition of a duty would be "fair, just, and
reasonable." 95 Second, when such a relationship exists, a prima facie duty to
exercise care exists, but the court must consider whether reasons or factors exist
which act to negate, reduce, or limit the prima facie duty.96 This two-stage approach
has been acknowledged since Anns, 97 but its application is now guarded. The
heaviest blow was struck by the House of Lords in Murphy v. Brentwood District
Council.98
The circumstances of Anns v. London Merton Borough Council 9 and the later
limiting decision of Murphy are similar. Both claimed negligence on the part of
local councils charged with issuing building permits. Recovery was allowed in
Anns; however, it was denied in Murphy.
In Anns, the Borough Council allegedly negligently inspected the foundations
of buildings constructed by Walcroft in 1962."° Several buildings were damaged
when their foundations settled.10' The House of Lords, following Lord
Wilberforce's two-stage analysis, held that the Borough Council owed a duty to the
plaintiffs-leaseholders of damaged flats-and therefore the costs of repairs were
recoverable."
In Murphy, a building contractor constructed 160 dwelling houses on a site in
Brentwood.'0 3 Two of these houses were built over filled ground on a concrete raft
foundation.'O' This raft had been designed by a firm of civil engineers. The plan
had to be submitted to the defendant District Council for approval before
94. Arms v. London Merton Borough Council, 1978 App. Cas. 728,734. Terms "neighbor," "proximity,"
and "proximate cause" are analogous whether used here or abroad. Although elastic on their faces, each suggests
an underlying principle that a negligent person is subject to liability only to certain individuals for certain kinds
of losses. Each label, but especially "neighbor," shows that the nature of the relationship between the parties may
determine the duty question. It is only a close "proximity" or a "special relationship" that may render the negligent
party liable for economic or emotional losses; a looser relationship may justify recovery for physical harm to
person or property. See McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 1983 App. Cas. 410 (an emotional distress claim similar to Thing
v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989), discussed further in Part l1.C.2); see also, e.g., Palsgraf, Donoghue, and
Junior Books as discussed in W. V. H. ROGERS, WIN.ELD & JOLOWICZ ON ToRTs 72-80,255-57 (14th ed. 1994).
95. Arms, 1978 App. Cas. at 728.
96. Was this two-step analysis new? See the well-reasoned speech of Lord Reid in Home Office v. Dorset
Yacht Co., 1970 A.C. 1004, 1027: "But I think that the time has come when we can and should say that
[Donoghue v. Stevenson] ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion."
97. The Lord Wilberforce formula was applied by the House of Lords in The Nicholas H decision,
discussed infra Part V.A.
98. 1991 App. Cas. 398.
99. 1978 App. Cas. 728.
100. Id. at 749.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 750.
103. Murphy, 1991 App. Cas. at 404.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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construction could begin')0 The District Council referred the proposed design to a
group of independent engineers.' 7 The engineers found the design appropriate, and
recommended approval.1 0 8 Following this advice, the District Council approved the
plan.
109
As the facts showed, the design was not appropriate, and the independent
engineers were negligent in approving the plan.' 0 Upon discovery of the cracks in
the rafts, the houses were no longer worth as much as they would have been had the
rafts been properly designed and constructed."' The action was thus brought to
recover the diminution in value of the homes, an economic loss of £35,000 per
home."2 The owners sued all those involved in the building project-including the
District Council. 1
3
The lower courts found that the District Council was legally responsible for the
negligence of the engineers and therefore must pay damages, specifically the
diminution in value of the home." 4 The judge specifically noted that the house, as
constructed, posed an "imminent danger."' 15 The District Council appealed, arguing
that it owed no duty to the purchaser for an economic loss." 6 Refusing to follow
Anns, the House of Lords reversed, because no physical harm had resulted from the
District Council's negligence." 7 This was a pure "economic loss" case; the
negligence harmed only the homes, it did not cause harm to other property or to a
person.
One widely recognized English tort expert noted that Lord Wilberforce's dual-
stage approach, as described in Anns, had reached its outer limits in a case decided
prior to Murphy, Junior Books Ltd. v. Veipichi Co."8 Junior Books was decided
after Anns and several years before Murphy. In Junior Books, the defendant
building contractor was legally responsible for the negligent installation of flooring
in the plaintiff s new building.' t 9 Differing from Anns, this negligence did not create






110. Id at 406.
111. Id.





117. Id. at 924.
118. 1982 App. Cas. 250. For a full discussion of these cases, see ROGERS, supra note 94, at 83.
119. ROGERS, supra note 94, at 81.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Except for Junior Books, the English courts' reaction to the Anns analysis was
cautious at best. Ultimately, the specific rule of Anns, allowing recovery of an
economic loss from a public agency, was overruled by Murphy.'22 Today's careful
application of the Anns duty analysis is reflected by a recent House of Lords
opinion, The Nicholas H.'2
In The Nicholas H, it was assumed that the defendant ship inspector's
negligence caused the ship to sink, which in turn caused the loss of the plaintiffs'
cargo.125 The question before the court was duty: did the negligent inspectors owe
a duty to the owners of the lost cargo? While seemingly applying the Anns analysis,
the majority held that no duty was owed, ostensibly following Murphy.
2 6
4. Conclusion: English Duty Description
The existing English rule requires the court to find a sufficient closeness in the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. When such a relationship
exists, the court must then ask if the recognition of a duty on the part of the
defendant would be "fair, just, and reasonable." This more general verbalization is
recognized even though one member of the House of Lords wisely stressed that
"[p]hrases such as 'foreseeability,' 'proximity,' 'neighborhood,' 'just and
reasonable,' and 'fairness' ... are not precise definitions. At best they are but labels
[that] must be carefully examined in each case before it can be pragmatically
determined whether a duty of care exists."'27
So much for England. On to the United States.
C. Duty Rules in the United States of America
In the United States, the popular and widely invoked label of "proximate cause"
has two meanings. It may mean that a legally significant causal connection exists
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm, or it may mean that the
negligent defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff for the latter's loss. When
"proximate cause" is used in the first sense, the proper question is whether the
defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the plaintiff's
harm. When used in this sense, the term is distinguishing actionable and irrelevant
122. See, for example, Lord Keith's speech in Murphy v. BrentwoodDistrict Council, 2 All E.R. 908 (1990).
123. Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co., 3 All E.R. 308 (1994) (The Nicholas H).
124. Id. at 686.
125. Id
126. For a similar American decision, see Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of Shipping, 7 F.3d
1077 (2d Cir. 1993).
127. Caparo Indus. v. Dickman, 199OApp. Cas. 605, 628. For an excellent discussion of the English rule,
see ROGEs, supra note 94, at 78-125; see also Alcock v. Chief Constable of S. Yorkshire, 1992 App. Cas. 310
(1992) (discussing foreseeability of consequential injury and proximity of relationship).
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causes of the plaintiff's harm. 28 "Proximaie cause" is not to be used when a
causation question is before a California court; 129 "legal cause" is the proper label.
This should be the practice in all jurisdictions.13
"Proximate cause" is used most often in the second sense, where the extent of
the culpable defendant's duty or legal responsibility is the issue. Duty questions are
difficult, and are left to the court. Unfortunately, courts often avoid the duty
question by saying that the defendant's negligence was or was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's harm.'
.Many courts in the United States give lip-service to the test of foreseeability,
or, with some frequency, allow recovery only for the "direct loss" sustained by the
plaintiff. Typically, the court's answer under either test is based on vague feelings
or intuitions of what is proper and desirable. 132 The misleading and ambiguous
character of "proximate cause" has led some to suggest its abandonment by the
courts of the United States.
33
When it is not clear in which sense the term is used, one should drop the
adjective "proximate" from the sentence. If the amended sentence makes sense,
then the term was used in its "cause" sense. The court was saying that the
defendant's conduct or product was a substantial factor (i.e., the "legal cause") of
the plaintiff's harm. However, if dropping "proximate" renders the amended
128. In such cases, cause-in-fact is a factual question: was the described conduct a cause-in-fact of the
victim's harm? This could be "proximate cause" in older usage, but it is "legal cause" today. Legal cause is simply
a limitation on the relevancy of existing causes-in-fact. Only those causes that can be labeled "substantial factors"
are relevant; they are the legal causes. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430-433 (1977); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 49, § 41.
129. See Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991). California's "Proximate Cause" instruction is
worded as follows: "A proximate cause of injury is a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces
the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred." CALIFORNIA BOOK OF APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (BAJI) No. 3.75 (8th ed. 1994). This instruction is no longer to be used in multiple cause cases.
The California "Legal Cause" instruction must be used in such cases. It is worded as follows: "A legal cause of
injury is a cause which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury." laL No. 3.76.
130. See Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1989) (applying "proximate cause" to causation, not duty,
in Colorado cases). The Colorado court distinguishes "duty" and "proximate cause" the latter referring only to
the strength of the causal connection. Id. at 1254-57; see also Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 879 (1991) (holding that BAJI
No. 3.75 should be disapproved and that the trial court erred in refusing to give the BAI No. 3.76 "legal cause"
instruction, rather than the BAI No. 3.75 instruction).
13 1. See Lyons, 770 P.2d at 1254. The duty question is for the court and is usually determined by, inter alia,
the extent, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury.
132. See Leon Green, Jury Trial and Proximate Cause, 35 TEx. L. REV. 357 (1957) (illustrating how
complex and confusing Texas negligence law has become). Discussing the Texas Supreme Court's analysis in
Biggers v. Continental Bus System, 298 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. 1956), Dean Green concludes, "[W]e are no wiser than
if the court had used a ouija board" Id. at 362; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 49, § 42.
133. E.g., Adams, supra note 48; Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLO. L. REV. 1401
(1960); E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions
Between Judge and Jury, I UTAH L. REV. 1 (1977). Dean Green is the leader of this group.
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sentence unclear in light of the context in which it is used, the court is saying that
the defendant is or is not legally responsible for the plaintiff's claimed harm.'34
1. American Rules in General
Most American courts follow the "foreseeability test" when faced with the duty
question: 35 that is, when the plaintiffs harm was reasonably foreseeable at the time
of the defendant's misconduct (i.e., the defendant's conduct was the "proximate
cause"), a duty exists. 136 Others use a slightly different test: where the actor's
conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm to a third person, the foreseeable harm
resulting from such conduct is proximately caused by that conduct. 37 In such cases,
the negligent defendant is legally responsible for the plaintiffs harm because the
risk of such harm was the very risk that made the conduct unreasonable.
138
Consider the infamous Palsgraf39 decision. The majority of the court
concluded that plaintiff Helen Palsgraf's harm was beyond the orbit of the judicial
eye, and therefore liability did not exist. t40 The majority agreed that she had
purchased tickets for herself and her daughters and that, while waiting on
defendant's platform forher train, she was struckby some falling scales.14' Whether
the movement of the scales was caused by nearby exploding fireworks (unlikely),
or by being struck by some member or members of the panicking crowd, did not
matter. 42 Palsgraf's proof was that her arm was bruised and that she developed a
speech impairment a few days later.43 Accepting Palsgraf's evidence, rather than
134. The California Supreme Court has forbidden the use of the term "proximate cause" in the cause sense.
"Substantial factor" is the proper expression or label when a causal issue exists. For a definition of "substantial
factor," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORrS § 431 (1977). If the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the plaintiff's harm, the defendant's conduct is a "legal cause" of plaintiff's harm so long as there
is no rule of law relieving the defendant from liability. See Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 872 (deciding that the "proximate
cause" instruction is not to be given for determining causation in California negligence cases).
135. See, for example, a rather interesting analysis of the issue in Fazzolari v. Portland School District, 734
P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987), as it is applied in Kimbler v. Stillwell, 734 P.2d 1344 (Or. 1987) (the former discussing and
determining the consequences of the distinction between foreseeability and duty; the latter, decided the same day,
applying those concepts accordingly). In Kimbler the court noted: "[N]o duty' is a defense argument that the
plaintiff's injury falls outside the foreseeable risks of the alleged negligent conduct, phrased as a legal conclusion
for the court rather than as a factual assessment of the foreseeable risks." Kimbler, 743 P.2d at 1346.
136. See, e.g., Gillilan v. Portland Crematorium Ass'n, 249 P. 627, 629 (Or. 1926) (deciding the plaintiff's
injuries could be a reasonable result of the defendant's conduct, from which he had a duty to protect the plaintiff).
137. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL, supra note 49, § 43 (discussing foreseability as related to the extent of legal
responsibility and causation).
138. See, e.g., Kliebenstein v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 188 N.W. 129 (Iowa 1922) (holding the defendant was
liable and a cause of the plaintiff's injury because the defendant had a duty to provide for plaintiff's safety).
139. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
140. Id. at 101.
141. Id. at99.
142. The actual record of the Palsgraf trial and its subsequent appeals is reprinted in an appendix to SCOTT
& KENT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1061-1105 (1967).
143. Id. at 1065.
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contrary proof, the jury found negligence on the part of the defendant railroad's
employees, and determined that this negligence was a cause of her stuttering. 4
Damages were set at $6,000.145 Even so, a majority of the judges on the court of
appeal considered her an unforeseen plaintiff, and therefore beyond the scope of the
railroad's duty to exercise ordinary care.' 46
It may be that this conclusion reflected Judge Cardozo's intuition as to what
was fair and reasonable under the circumstances. That notwithstanding, how did he
define the scope of the negligent defendant's foresight? His analysis remains
hidden. The test of foreseeability is very subjective.
Similar "hiding of the ball" exists in other American decisions. A wel-known
federal appellate decision written by Judge Friendly, In re Kinsman Transit
Company (Kinsman 1),47 provides another example. In effect, Kinsman I held that
foreseeability is not the sole determinant of a negligent person's duty. 48 A negligent
tortfeasor is responsible even for unforeseen harm, so long as that harm is "direct"
and not too tenuous. 49
It seems that in his dissent in Palsgraf, Judge Andrews' answer is as close to
the truth as most American courts have come:
What is a cause in a legal sense, still more what is a proximate cause,
depend[s] in each case upon many considerations, as does the existence of
negligence itself.... An overturned lantern may burn all [of] Chicago. We
may follow the fire from the shed to the last building. We rightly say the
fire started by the lantern caused its destruction. A cause, but not the
proximate cause. What we do mean by the word "proximate" is that,
144. Id. at 1067-68.
145. Id. The verdict was sizeable; a V12 Cadillac convertible would have cost but $4,500 at that time!
146. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
147. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (Kinsman 1). In this case, during the winter,
the defendant dock owner's employee negligently moored a ship, the Shiras, at defendant Kinsman Transit
Company's dock. During the night, the ice-filled, swiftly flowing Buffalo River freed the negligently secured ship.
It was carried across the river and into another ship, the Tewksbury, breaking the latter loose. The two ships drifted
downstream until they crashed into the city's unopened drawbridge, causing it to collapse. The fallen bridge, the
two ships, and the ice flows dammed the river, causing the flooding of warehouses positioned along the river
upstream from the bridge, personal injury to bridge personnel, and damage to nearby ships.
The negligence of the defendants Kinsman and the defendant city were found to be "substantial factors" in
causing the personal injuries and property damage. The admiralty court had no doubt that the negligent
defendants' duty included the losses suffered by such plaintiffs. Id. at 713.
Kinsman I1 arrived at the appellate level four years later. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968) (Kinsman HI). This claim was for an economic loss; the plaintiff's downstream ship could not be moved
upstream for unloading. The plaintiff incurred additional expenses and had to buy more expensive wheat to
replace the wheat that was still on board the trapped vessel. Judge Kaufman, following Judge Friendly and Judge
Andrews' views, held that the injuries to the plaintiff were "too tenuous and remote" to permit recovery even
though caused by the defendants' negligence. There was no duty. Il at 825.
148. See, e.g., Kinsman I, 338 F.2d at 723 (noting that the term "foreseeable" does not connote "anything
that has in fact occurred").
149. Id. at 724-26.
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because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.
This is not logic. It is practical politics.'
2. The California Rule
The California Supreme Court determines the limits of a negligent party's duty
by considering such factors as:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent
of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.,51
These factors are limitations on the California statutory provision that:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has,
willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.5 2
The California Supreme Court points out that, under this general statute, an
individual who is acting negligently is liable for all reasonably foreseeable injuries
caused by that negligence, subject to the exception of cases where a ruling of no
duty is "clearly supported by public policy.'
5 3
However, special problems arise in California when the claimed harm is not
tangible or physical. Economic or emotional harms are examples. Such a case is
presented in Bily v. Arthur Young,'5 where the majority of the court found that the
negligent defendant owed no duty to the third parties for their economic harm. 55
In Bily, the defendant accounting firm prepared an audit report expressing its
unqualified opinion that a corporation's financial statements fairly represented its
150. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103-04 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
151. Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 190 (Cal. 1991) (quoting Thompson v. County of
Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (1980).
152. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1714(a) (West 1998). Compare the French equivalent, C. civ. art. 1304.
153. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561,564 (Cal. 1968).
154. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
155. Id. at 767-68.
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financial condition.'5 6 The defendant had implied that the report had been prepared
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. 5 7 One hundred copies
of this report were given to the client-corporation, which in turn distributed copies
to potential investors, including the plaintiffs. 5 8 Many of these investors relied on
the defendant's report when deciding to invest in the corporation. 159 The audited
statements contained errors that the defendant could have discovered had it
followed generally accepted auditing standards.' 6 As a result of this negligence,
many investors incurred significant economic losses when the corporation was
formally declared bankrupt.161
A jury found that the defendant had been negligent, and awarded damages to
those plaintiffs who had relied upon the defendant's negligently prepared audit
report. 162 The principal question on appeal was whether the defendant had been
under a duty to exercise care to protect the plaintiffs, as foreseeable users of the
audit report.163
The majority of the California Supreme Court concluded that the defendants
owed the plaintiff-users no duty.' 64 Even though California's definition of duty
requires consideration of each of the factors listed above, the majority was
impressed with the heavy burden that would be imposed on the accounting firm
when only moral fault was involved.' 65 They also worried that the burden of
responsibility for the firm's neglect would be so onerous that such firms would be
unwilling or financially unable to engage in socially beneficial activities.
66
, Such considerations are important when deciding the duty question. However,
full consideration was given to all of the factors enumerated in Christensen.'67 One
must compare the reasoning of the majority with that of the minority. Will this no-
duty rule as to economic losses caused by accountants be sustained? The court did
recognize that tort liability is socially beneficial to the extent that it provides both
156. Id. at 747-50.
157. Id. at 747-48.




162. The jury set the plaintiffs' compensatory damages at $4.3 million, representing about 75% of each
investment made by the plaintiffs. This award was affirmed by the court of appeal. Id. at 749.
163. IM.
164. Id. at 774.
165. Id. at 782.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (listing the Christensen factors, which California courts
use to limit a party's duties).
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an incentive for due care and compensation for those who have been injured.' 68
These factors auger for a finding of duty.
Claims for emotional distress damages are another area of non-tangible, non-
physical harm cases which cause trouble for California courts.The courts have
created special rules for addressing such clams.' 69 Using the Rowland factors, the
California Supreme Court has limited a negligent party's legal responsibilities for
emotional distress suffered by bystanders. In Thing v. La Chusa,170 the plaintiff
suffered emotional distress when she learned that her child had been seriously
injured just after leaving home.17' She saw her injured child before the child was
taken to the hospital. 72 The court ruled that a bystander's claim for emotional
distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person would
be recognized if, but only if, the plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injured victim;
(2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event when it occurs and is then
aware that such event is causing physical harm to the victim; and (3) as a result,
suffers serious emotional distress-an emotional reaction beyond that which would
be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to
the circumstances.' 73
The court acknowledged that "[e]xperience has shown that.., there are clear
judicial days on which a court can foresee forever,.., but none where foresight
alone cannot provide a socially and judicially acceptable limit on" the negligent
defendant's liability.' 74 Additional factors must be considered to define the extent
of a tortfeasor's duty.
3. Summary of American Law
In California and elsewhere, the determination of duty is a question of law.
When setting the limits of a negligent defendant's legal responsibility for another's
harm, foreseeability is still mentioned as the main factor. However, it is not the only
factor. Foreseeability is the combination of all the factors which lead the law to
hold that the particular plaintiff is or is not entitled to protection. It is the argument
168. Bily involved an economic loss on the part of the plaintiffs. A similar "duty question" decision
involving emotional distress can be studied in Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992). The
California Supreme Court held in Burgess that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation for emotional distress,
but not for the loss of the child's consortium. id. at 1198. The opinion discusses the difference between "direct
victims" and "bystanders." Id. at 1199; see also Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
(holding that a psychotherapist, who determines that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another,
incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim from such danger).
169. See, for example, Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989), which is discussed infra notes 170-74
and accompanying text.
170. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
171. Id. at 815.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 830.
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of this author, as well as other commentators, that any number of considerations
may justify the imposition of duty in particular circumstances, including the
guidance of history, continually refined concepts of morals and justice, the
convenience of the rule, and social judgments as to where blame should be
placed. 75 Accordingly, the question must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
More commonly, every case is governed by the rule of general application that
all persons are required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured
as a result of their conduct, but foreseeability of harm is a general limitation on the
extent of a negligent defendant's legal liability. Essentially, the first question
becomes: was the risk of the harm to the plaintiff foreseeable? 76 This raises the
necessary question of who decides what is foreseeable. In addition, even if the harm
is not "foreseeable," liability may exist either if the harm is "direct," or if public
policy requires responsibility. This seems to be the American rule. It is all quite
subjective. Lawyers must predict an existing court's answer to these general
notions. Uncertainty is an undesirable but necessary condition.
IV. A PROPOSED ANALYSIS
A. Introductory Comments
The following proposal is addressed to lawyers and law students. Through their
efforts, change will occur. Judges are dependent on the work of those who appear
before them. In common law jurisdictions, judges make the law, but, when doing
so, they rely on material provided by lawyers. In the final analysis, it is the lawyer
who must convince a judge to rule one way or the other on a particular question of
law. By producing reasons for a proposed decision, the lawyer becomes more
convincing.
For example, in the true duty case, the helpful lawyer will not argue about the
foreseeability of a particular crime being committed on school grounds; she will
argue why the school should or should not bear the burden of the plaintiff's harm.1
77
How is she to do this?
I suggest that she start her analysis of the duty issue by first "wiping the slate
clean."'78 She should ignore all conclusive portions of judicial decisions. The first
175. See William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MsCH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953) (stating "that in the decision
whether or not there is a duty, many factors interplay: the hand of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the
convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall").
176. Weirum v. RKO Gen. Inc., 539 P.2d 30 (Cal. 1975).
177. This example assumes that causal negligence can be shown on the part of the school. See Fazzolari v.
Portland Sch. Dist., 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987) (affirming court of appeal's determination that case against school
district should be remanded for trial where fifteen-year-old plaintiff was raped on school grounds just before 7 a.m.
on a school day). 1
178. This multi-step analysis should be used when arguing for or against an existing rule, or when faced
with a novel set of circumstances.
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step requires identification of the adjudicative facts of each relevant decision. 79
Second, that court's answer to the duty question (i.e., whether a duty was or was not
present) must be noted. Third, she will evaluate the court's answer to the duty
question, asking whether the result is "good" or "bad" for society. Finally, her
answer must be evaluated by the judge. This requires a listing of the reasons
opposing and supporting the proposed ruling.
Stating reasons is the most difficult step in the analysis. One may no longer rely
on arguments about the "foreseeability" of the harm or whether the harm was a
"direct" result of the defendant's negligence. Lawyers must identify the reasons for
and against shifting the loss suffered by the victim to a negligent defendant. 80
It must be understood that the proposal described below is not intended to
change existing law. This is not the place to quibble about the liability of
accountants or ship inspectors. The proposal simply describes how one should
proceed when faced with a duty question. The goal is not to change existing
answers, but to more objectively value existing rules and thereby improve the
predictability of the law.
The almost reverent, but clearly mystical, descriptions of duty in existing
decisions must be shredded. Words such as "foreseeable" and "neighbor" have no
place in arguments about the nature and extent of a negligent person's legal
responsibility for harm caused to another. Reasonable courts should establish rules
that "will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of
mankind."''
1
B. The Factors Behind the Duty Argument
The proposed analysis is simple and far from revolutionary. It consists of a
relatively short checklist to be followed by lawyers and judges faced with the duty
question. The list is an elaboration of Dean Green's "factors.' 8 2 These
considerations fit well within the guidelines and pet phrases often uttered by
courts 8 3 and writers. "4 Of course, some favorite words and pet phrases are omitted
from the proposal. Such useless but frequently encountered "factors" or labels
179. We must distinguish "adjudicative facts" from "legislative facts." Study the Advisory Committee Note
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201. The proposed analysis described later in this Article depends on the
free use of legislative facts when resolving the so-called "duty question."
180. We will avoid defenses at this time. Our concern is limited to the duty element of a prima facie
negligence case.
181. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
182. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1034 (1928), and
its continuation at 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255 (1929), for the source of these factors.
183. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (articulating factors for determining
whether a duty is owed).
184. See, e.g., KEaTON Er AL, supra note 49, § 43 (discussing "unforeseeable consequences," "direct
causation" and "the despised word 'proximate"').
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include terms and phrases such as "foreseeability," "direct," "indirect," "proximate
cause" and "too remote." None of these terms appear in this proposal. They are at
best misleading, and, at worst, useless.185
Our primary checklist includes the following:
1. The Nature of the Plaintiff's Harm
Tort law does not provide a remedy for every harm. We cannot solve every
social problem by simply "passing a law." There are many ways to control conduct;
tort law is but one. Other methods to control conduct include self-protection, honor,
affection, decency, conventions, religion, and the ties and disciplines of the family
and of numerous trade organizations such as schools, churches, fraternities,
professional societies, civic clubs, and trade groups.1 6 Government enforcement
affects conduct through several avenues. These include criminal law, contract law,
regulatory agencies, and tort law. Therefore, identifying the precise harm suffered
by the plaintiff is the starting point in the duty question analysis.18 7 All harms are
not protected equally. Society has chosen to provide a rather full protection against
harms of a physical nature, but partial or no protection against non-physical harms.
Two examples of harm follow.
a. Economic Loss
It can be said that the so-called "economic loss" rule is used to define the
boundaries between tort and contract law. This rule precludes tort recovery where
contract damages are the appropriate remedy.188 Generally speaking, if there is an
enforceable contract, the economic loss rule will preempt tort claims. There are
exceptions, but these will not be studied here.' 89
185. For an example of the use of such terms, see Judge Kaufman's opinion in Kinsman II, 388 F.2d 821,
822, 825 (2d Cir. 1968).
186. See the list in LEON GREEN, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 132 (1987).
187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToirs § 7 (1977) (explaining:
(1) The word 'injury' is used... to denote the invasion of any legally protected interest of another.
(2) The word 'harm' is used ... to denote the existence of loss or determent in fact of any kind to
a person resulting from any cause.
(3) The words 'physical harm' are used.., to denote the physical impairment of the human body,
or of land or chattels.).
188. See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) ("[w]hen a
product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its
contractual remedies are strong").
189. See, e.g., AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987) (providing that a
purchaser cannot recover for economic losses in tort absent (1) a claim for personal injury or property damages;
or (2) proof of a tort independent of breach of contract). A tort action will lie if there is fraud in inducement of
the contract (an independent tort situation). HTP Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla.
1996). The economic loss rule bars a tort action in non-insurance contract breach cases. See Freeman & Mills,
Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995), overruling Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard
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When no breach of contract is involved, the economic loss rule may still be a
defense to liability. A negligent defendant causing an economic loss to another is
usually free from liability even though that defendant will be subject to liability to
others who suffered physical harm from the same event.' 90 To many, this limitation
of responsibility is not appealing, and, as a result, exceptions to the general rule
have been widely recognized. 91
b. Emotional Distress
Like economic loss claims, when emotional distress claims are raised, courts
are reluctant to impose liability on a negligent defendant. Such a person is subject
to liability only under certain conditions. 92 In most states, when a negligent
defendant causes physical harm to one party and emotional distress to other parties,
there is no liability to the bystanders unless such bystanders are found to be within
the "zone of danger.
' 193
2. The Economic Factor: Who Should Pay
Keeping costs' 94 down is an important consideration when the duty question is
raised. It is also important that we identify who can most efficiently spread the costs
of the harm.' 95 At this juncture, the differences between first-party and third-party
insurance coverage must be remembered. 196 This was important in The Nicholas
H.
197
Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984), which had recognized a tort action for bad faith breach of a non-insurance
contract. Cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Aurora Air Serv., 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979) (exemplifying a successful
claim that the defendant induced another to breach its contract with plaintiff).
190. Compare Kinsman I, 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (permitting award of damages to a plaintiff who
suffered property damage due to the crash of a drifting vessel into a city bridge),with Kinsman 11, 388 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1968) (finding that awarding damages to a company that suffered no property damage, but had to rent
special equipment to unload cargo due to the collapse of the bridge, would be overly speculative).
191. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); People Express Airlines, Inc. v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (NJ. 1985); J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
192. Recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is also limited. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OFTORTs § 46 (1977) (requiring the intent to recklessly inflict, as well as the actual, reckless infliction of, severe
emotional distress by extreme and outrageous conduct). The "zone of danger" rule is not the only rule governing
the liability of a negligent defendant's liability for emotional distress. See the brief discussion of Thing v.
LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814 (1989), supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
193. See KErTON Er AL, supra note 49, § 54 n.46.
194. "Costs" are not simply pecuniary in nature. The further inconvenience of altering a product, such as
the addition of a new safety device or the closing down of an activity, are other instances of "cost."
195. See Judge Friendly's discussion of cost-spreading in Kinsman 1, 338 F.2d at 725-26.
196. More of the premium dollar is available to cover the loss under a first-party insurance policy (e.g.,
a residential fire insurance policy). A third-party insurance contract covers the insured's legal liability to third
parties; higher costs are involved in resolving the nature and extent of such liability. This means that a
substantially smaller portion of the premium dollar remains to cover the loss.
197. Infra Part V.A.1.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
It is important that we distinguish the algebraic formula described by Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.'98 from the economic factor
that is so important to the analysis proposed herein. In Carroll Towing, the widely
recognized risk/benefit test for negligence was dressed in economic clothing that
created a feeling of certainty in the mind of the casual reader. In the Carroll Towing
case, the court was faced with the negligence/breach issue. Economic
considerations were used to properly reach a solution. Simply put, the so-called
"Hand Formula" compares the cost of loss prevention with the dollar value of the
risk of loss. Under this formula, a failure to take steps to prevent such a loss when
the dollar value of the risk of loss exceeds the prevention costs would be considered
negligence. 99 We are not faced with this question now; rather, we are only
concerned with the extent of a negligent defendant's legal responsibility.
Economic factors are of critical importance when the duty question exists.
Today's courts must consider consumers' costs. These costs include actual out-of-
pocket expense of goods or services as well as the changes, if any, in the usefulness
and availability of a product or service. Additionally, courts must consider how the
cost of increased safety is to be spread.
3. Deterrence: They Won't Do This Again
Neither criminal sanctions nor tort liability prevent the repetition of antisocial
acts. However, such penalties are effective to some limited extent. One such
example is the expansion of a seller's tort liability beyond privity to consumers.
Since MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,200 the seller of a product has been subject
to liability to the users of the product for negligence. Most agree that this increase
in the scope of the negligent manufacturer's responsibility has forced the
production of safer products. 20'
The proper question is, "Will the imposition of a duty have a positive effect on
the safety of a product?" If the answer is yes, then the imposition of a duty may be
the answer. This is just another issue for argument before a judge at a pretrial
hearing on a defendant's motion to dismiss.
198. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
199. Id. at 173; see McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1556 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Unreasonable
conduct is merely the failure to take precautions that would generate greater benefits in avoiding accidents than
the precautions would cost.").
200. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
201. In most cases, the so-called "strict product liability" rule does not impose true strict liability. Strict
liability is based on the misrepresentation theory in some product liability cases. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 402A (1977); KEETON ET A.., supra note 49, § 99(1); see also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d
1153 (Cal. 1972) (holding that a production defect rendered a product unreasonably dangerous, or not reasonably
safe).
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4. Administrative Factor: Ease of Adjudication
The ability to easily adjudicate a particular dispute is another significant policy
consideration for parties confronted with a duty question. Can our court system
handle the case fairly, or is this something that should be left to legislation,
administrative action, or simply self-help? It can be argued that an action for
recovery of damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress is a good example.
Such claims raise issues difficult to handle in an adversarial proceeding. In the first
place, courts still have not agreed on the extent of a negligent person's legal
responsibility for emotional distress. Most courts recognize a duty to victims who
were in the "zone of danger."202 However, a few jurisdictions extend the negligent
defendant's duty to include the physically harmed individual's close family
members who perceived the infliction of the physical harm. 20 3 All recognize that the
jury value of an emotional distress case is almost impossible to predict. In the eyes
of many, any award of damages constitutes "over punishment" of the negligent
offender.2' The widely held belief that emotional distress is easily faked, usually
exaggerated, and generally transitory, supports denial of legal responsibility for
negligent infliction unless such distress is a result of physical harm. Only then
should the courts take on this difficult valuation task.
5. Justice: Why They Should Pay
The justice factor asks the question, "Is it important that the victim or society
'get even' with the negligent defendant?" If the imposition of a cause of action will
effect closure, then a duty ruling may be in order. Usually this factor serves more
as a "tie-breaker" than the factors already listed.
6. Morality
Like the justice factor, "morality" is also a "tie-breaker." When the imposition
of liability on a negligent defendant would seem immoral, there is a reluctance to
impose a duty. On the other hand, one's sense of morality cannot dictate tort
liability. The comparative weakness of morality as a reason supporting the
recognition of a duty is demonstrated by the prevailing "no duty to rescue" rule. 05
Most agree that a failure to render aid is highly immoral, yet there is no legal duty
to raise a hand. In fact, an effort to render aid is discouraged by the rule that once
202. For an explanation of this concept, see generally KEaTON Er AL., supra note 49, § 54.
203. E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A Cmt. b (1977) (reflecting the "Zone of Danger" rule).
205. See Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898) (stating that the presence of a moral duty alone
is not sufficient to sustain liability); KEETON Er AL., supra note 49, § 54, 375-77.
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one assists another, a duty to exercise ordinary care is created.206 In an effort to
overcome this impediment to rescue efforts, state legislatures have enacted so-
called "Good Samaritan Statutes. ' '2°7 Such statutes create an immunity for all but
those members of a described class who have acted recklessly in rescue attempts.2 8
This is not a complete list of considerations. The listed factors provide a basic
checklist. The task must be left to the lawyers in the particular case to identify case-
relevant policy considerations for the court.
However, each of the factors is important. When trial courts make it clear that
any duty question will be resolved by consideration of such factors, the
participating lawyers will be forced to offer evidence in support of their policy
arguments. This proof requirement will sharpen the analysis without materially
increasing court time.2 9
This proposal is not foolproof. As Dean Green warned when describing his list,
"There is no assurance in such a formula save as it may be grasped by the
intelligence of those to whom the power to pass judgment is entrusted. 210 It is the
lawyer who must educate and corral or confine judges. To argue foreseeability,
fairness, or proximity will leave the judge with wide discretion. Stick to policy
arguments and in that way force the judge to consider only relevant factors.
V. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Under the proposed analysis, lawyers and judges must first identify the issues
in each case and, when duty is among them, reason their way to a socially desirable
result. Four relatively well-known events and the litigation that followed will be
described and analyzed. They demonstrate the need to be specific when describing
both adjudicative facts and applicable law.
The catastrophe in The Nicholas H.21 presents a clear duty question, and the
opportunity to factor our way to justice. The Kinsman disaster demonstrates the
importance of distinguishing harms when defining the scope of a negligent
defendant's legal responsibility.212 Long v. Turk-213 requires careful identification of
206. KEaTON Er AL., supra note 49, § 56.
207. These statutes derive their name from the Biblical parable found at Luke 10:29-36.
208. For a more general statute requiring action subject to being fined, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 120, § 519
(1998). Of course, most states require any motorists involved in an auto accident to render aid to victims of such
accidents. For an interesting article on this important subject, see Gilbert Geis, The Good, the Bad, and the Duty-
Bound, L.A. DAILY J., OcL 3, 1997, at 6.
209. Again, the "evidence" to which the text refers consists of "legislative" facts. Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 201, ordinary exclusionary rules are inapplicable. Study carefully the Advisory Committee's Note to
Federal Rule of Evidence 201. State rules are similar.
210. Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 11, 29 CoLUM. L. REv. 255,284 (1929).
211. Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co., 3 All E.R. 307 (1995) (The Nicholas H); see supra Part
V.A (explaining the particulars of this case).
212. See infra Part V.B (exploring the Kinsman I and Kinsman 11 decisions).
213. 962 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1998).
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issues as a predicate to reaching an acceptable solution. The New Jersey decision
in J.S.v.R.TH.2 t4 asks when the wife of an evil husband can be legally responsible
for her husband's despicable conduct. This is another pure duty case.
Working with these four test situations should highlight the strengths and
weaknesses of existing duty rules and the proposal described in this Article.
A. Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co. (The Nicholas H)
The case of Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co.,215 commonly referred
to as The Nicholas H, presented an interesting, but not unusual,1 6 set of facts raising
a debatable duty question that was finally resolved by the House of Lords. The
decision could have gone either way.
1. Facts
In early 1986, the ship Nicholas H loaded cargos of lead and zinc at South
American ports.217 This cargo was supposed to be delivered to an Italian port and
a port in the Black Sea.21 8 After the final loading, the vessel proceeded on her
voyage.21 9 However, within a short time a crack developed in her hull.220 The master
of the vessel was concerned about the vessel's fitness for the rest of the voyage.221
He anchored Nicholas H three miles off San Juan in Puerto Rico.222 A surveyor
employed by ship-inspector Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK) was called to inspect the
damage.? He issued a recommendation that the vessel proceed into port and
undergo permanent repairs in dry dock.2 4
214. 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998).
215. 3 All E.R. 307 (1995).
216. See, e.g., Sundance Cruises Corp. v. American Bureau of Shipping, 7 F.3d 1077, 1078 (2d Cir. 1993)
(regarding a suit brought by shipowners against a classification society that issued safety certificates before it
struck an underwater rock and sank).






223. For the uninitiated, NKK, the target defendant, is a Japanese corporation founded in 1899. It is the third
largest "classification society" in the world. NKK is a non-governmental, non-profit inspector of ships. Its purpose
is to promote the safety of life and ships at sea-all in the public interest. In order to get insurance and business,
all ocean-going vessels must be "classified." NIK classifies ships of any nationality. An owner who is desirous
of having a ship classified submits an application to carry out a survey in accordance with existing rules and
regulations. Ships classified by NKK, or any other classification society, are entered into the published Register
of Ships. In order to carry on business, each ship's classification has to be renewed periodically. Further, when
repairs are deemed necessary, they must be performed to the satisfaction of a classification society such as NKK.
The maintenance of classification is conditioned upon a ship's compliance with all applicable rules and
regulations.
224. The Nicholas H, 3 All E.R. at 323.
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Such repairs would have required the unloading of the cargo, which would have
been expensive and time-consuming. 225 The owners objected. 26 For some
unexplained reason, the original recommendation was rescinded; temporary repairs
were authorized by the surveyor.227 The approval was given on the condition that
the originally described permanent repairs be made shortly after the vessel arrived
at its destination.228 The newly described work was completed and approved.229
Within a day of leaving San Juan, the temporary repairs failed. The Nicholas H
sank, and its $6 million cargo was lost.230
2. The Litigation
The cargo owners sued the shipowners and the defendant classification society,
NKK, alleging negligence.231 The shipowners settled the claim by paying
$500,000.232-Following settlement, NKK moved for dismissal.233 The motion was
denied, and the litigation continued against NKK for the balance of the plaintiff's
loss-approximately $5.7 million.?
The NKK motion for dismissal raised the question: did NKK owe a duty of care
to the cargo owners? The trial court had concluded that a duty existed.235 However,
this ruling was reversed by a majority on the appellate court.26 The appellate
court's "no duty" ruling was appealed by the cargo owners to the House of Lords.237
A majority of the House of Lords agreed that no duty existed on the part of the
defendant surveyors. 38 The only issue before the courts had been duty.239
The cargo had been loaded under a bill of lading incorporating the Hague
Rules.240 To NKK, this meant that the shipowner, and not NKK, had the duty to








232. Id. This amount represented the extent of the shipowner's liability for cargo loss due to the tonnage
limitations applicable to such vessels.
233. The Nicholas H, 3 All E.R. at 324.
234. md. at 325.
235. kI at 325.
236. Id
237. Id at 326.
238. Id at 332-33.
239. Id. at 322-23.
240. Id. at 323.
241. Id. at 326.
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contractual claim, derived by the Hague Rules,242 by the plaintiff cargo owners
against the ship's owners precluded NKK's exposure to liability to the cargo
owners.243 It was NKK's argument that the cargo owners' exclusive action was
against the shipowners for breach of a non-delegable duty to ensure the
seaworthiness of the vessel. 244 In NKK's view, to hold otherwise would not be fair,
just, or reasonable.245
The majority of the House of Lords panel agreed with this argument.246 Even
though the loss was foreseeable and an identifiable, but non-contractual,
relationship or proximity existed between the cargo owners and NKK,
considerations of fairness, justice, and reasonableness supported the appellate
court's "no duty" holding.247 Furthermore, the assumed negligence of NKK's
surveyor did not involve the "direct infliction of physical damage in the relevant
sense." 248 Using such "reasons," the majority of the Law Lords ruled that NKK did
not owe a duty of care to the cargo owners.249
3. Application of New Analysis
The basic English rule defining duty requires findings of foreseeability and
proximity. When these elements exist, the English judge must consider whether
fairness, justice, and reasonableness negate the existence of a duty in the particular
case. These additional considerations, though quite vague, lead English lawyers and
judges down narrower streets than'simply the determination of foreseeability and
proximity.
250
Following such analysis, the House of Lords held in The Nicholas H that the
cargo owners had no cause of action against negligent surveyors.25' Although a
242. The Hague Rules, and their successors the Hague-Visby Rules, together with the Carriage of Goods
By Sea Act of 1971, form an internationally recognized code adjusting the rights and duties existing between
shipowners and those shipping goods under bills of lading. These are the rules that limit a negligent shipowner's
liability to cargo owners. Neither treaties nor statutes say anything about the liability of surveyors such as NKK
to cargo owners. Id. at 324-25.
243. Id. at 326.
244. l at 311.
245. Ia at312.
246. Id. at 317.
247. l at313-17.
248. L at 328.
249. IL at 332-33.
250. To some extent, this English rule resembles the existing rule in California. The starting point under
California's definition is the general principle set forth in California Civil Code Section 1714. The limitations on
this general principle are described in decisions such as Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958), and Rowland
v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). These include the certainty of injury, availability and cost of insurance,
moral blame, and the prevention of future harm.
251. The Nicholas H, 3 All E.R. at 333.
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contrary result could be reached under the proposed analysis, this holding is
supportable under the English rule.s
2
Following the proposed analysis, it is first noted that the plaintiffs' claims are
for physical damage, not mere economic losses. Also, the deterrence, morality, and
justice factors seem to favor a finding of duty, as NKK's surveyor was at fault.
From NKK's no-duty position, the battle over duty should focus on the economic
and administrative factors. And it did.
First, the economic factor. One of the reasons mentioned in Lord Steyn's
speech supporting the finding of no duty is that a "no duty" ruling would reduce
overall insurance costs.23 They assumed that cargo owners would be insured
against such marine losses. Certainly, ship owners carry liability insurance
sufficient to comply with the Hague Rules. NKK argued that the shipowner's
liability coverage is structured with an eye to the limitations on a shipowner's
liability imposed by the Hague Rules.' They assumed that shipowners and cargo
owners knew that a cargo loss that exceeds Hague Rule limitations on the
shipowner's liability would be covered by the cargo owner's more efficient first-
party insurance. Therefore, existing coverages provide a simple and efficient way
to distribute cargo losses resulting from such marine disasters. Such arguments
persuaded most of the judges to find that a "no duty" ruling would be fair, just, and
reasonable. Even though this denial of duty precludes tort actions against negligent
surveyors, the majority of the Law Lords saw this solution as economic and
administratively clean.
This author submits that a closer examination of the economic factor might
produce a different ruling. No one suggested that NKK's liability coverage would
have been inadequate to cover its share of responsibility for this loss of cargo.
Without doubt, the surveyors' insurance costs are passed on to shipowners as part
of the fees shipowners pay for such required services. The shipowner's costs are
252. Lord Steyn authored the majority opinion. Lord Lloyd of Berwick agreed with the trial court judge;
he felt that the classification society owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff cargo owners. The fact that
the shipowners were responsible did not mean that the classification society was not responsible. In his mind, the
loss of cargo was foreseeable and the proximity or relationship between the cargo owners and the society was very
close. Id. at 311-13 (Berwick, L., dissenting). So much for the rather subjective elements. More significantly,
neither Lord Lloyd of Berwick nor the trial court judge had difficulty seeing how the recognition of a duty on the
part of the society would be unfair or unreasonable. NKK was simply ajoint tortfeasor; there should be a sharing
of responsibility with the ship owners. Neither would have had a claim for indemnity against the other.
253. See The Nicholas H, 3 All E.R. at 330 (discussing the current double insurance system of the cargo).
The argument articulated in the speech by Lord Lloyd of Berwick in his dissent is not bothered by this insurance
argument. Id. at 314-15, 320-21 (Berwick, L., dissenting).
254. lit at330. The wisdom ofreading the Hague Rules as supporting this newly created limitation on cargo
owners' rights against classification societies is quite debatable. The majority simply concludes that Hague
limitations on the liability of shipowners to the owners of cargo create an overall limitation on the rights of cargo
owners. Under this twisted thinking, the Hague Rules create an immunity for negligent surveyors. Immunities
make for a tidy tort system. Lord Steyn's view is that classification societies act for the collective welfare and are
therefore entitled to protection against claims for harm unless directly inflicted by the society, here, NKK. lit at
331.
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charged to shippers. The ultimate burden of all insurance coverage is borne by the
consumer of the shipped goods.
The facts to support arguments under the economic factor are readily available.
The availability of the different coverages, and the premiums involved, would be
established as would be any other legislative fact during pre-trial or at any stage
later in the litigation. These facts (i.e., the availability and cost of insurance) are
much more certain than the never-ending arguments of lawyers and judges today
about foreseeability and proximity.
The Law Lords considered the administrative factor. Again, the validity of the
majority's conclusion can be debated. It was argued that this added layer of legal
responsibility 5s presents administrative problems. The significance of this
possibility should be developed early in the litigation. The recognition of a duty on
surveyors means that joint and several liability may exist in cases such as this. This
does not seem to present serious administrative problems. Courts face joint and
several liability claims in many situations. 6 Such hassles are routine events for
first-party insurers who assert subrogation claims against third-party insurers.
The remaining factors support the recognition of a duty. Deterrence,justice, and
morality seem to tip the scales in favor of imposing a duty. The imposition of a duty
on surveyors will encourage them to be careful when carrying out their important
function. Further, the imposition of a duty will promote justice and morality. These
factors may be as significant as the economic and administrative factors in this case.
One cannot assume that surveyors realize how important due care is in the
performance of their public-interest function. However, the prospect of civil
liability may encourage them to exercise care."
In concluding this discussion of The Nicholas H, it should be noted that the
recognition of a duty on the part of surveyors would mean that the negligent
surveyor and the negligent ship owner would be joint tortfeasors. In such a case,
they should share responsibility. Neither the negligent surveyor nor the negligent
ship owner would have a claim for indemnity against the other 58 The fair
allocation of legal responsibility is not administratively complex.
Our examination of The Nicholas H demonstrates that the proposed analysis
does not dictate the result in every case. However, using the proposal eliminates
255. Recognition of a duty would mean that cargo owners could sue negligent surveyors.
256. For example garden-variety automobile accidents frequently involve claims against drivers,
manufacturers of motor vehicles, and the governmental agencies charged with the creation and maintenance of
highways.
257. See the reference to the apparent proliferation of substandard classification societies made by Lord
Lloyd of Berwick in his opinion in The Nicholas H, 3 All E.R. at 321. For further discussion, see JONATHAN LuX,
CLASSIFICATION SOCeErlS viii (1993).
258. This should eliminate any subrogation actions by the liability carriers; each would eventually pay its
share of the plaintiff's loss. In this case, if the cargo insurer paid the balance due of $5.7 million, it would seek
indemnity from the liability carrier. In any event, the "wrongdoers" would be paying the loss.
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arguments about the undefinable; lawyers will know which legislative facts the
court will need when required to decide the duty question.
B. The Kinsman Decisions
The Kinsman decisions?59 highlight the importance of the nature of the harm
when deciding the duty question. Courts seem quite willing to recognize a duty
when physical harm has been inflicted on persons, land, or chattels, but they seem
to drag their collective feet when faced with emotional distress or economic loss
claims; few tears are shed for plaintiffs when their sole claims are of an emotional
or economic nature.
The two Kinsman actions arose out of a rather unusual chain of events. Kinsman
Iinvolved physical damage to ships and a city's bridge, plus the upstream flooding
of the plaintiffs' warehouses and stored property.260 Kinsman H was brought by
shippers who were unable to move their goods upstream for delivery pursuant to
contracts during the two months that the Buffalo River was blocked by the ships
and the fallen Michigan Avenue Bridge.261 The plaintiffs in Kinsman II claimed
economic loss as a result of the blockage of the river.262
1. The Adjudicative Facts
This winter disaster had several causes, some natural in origin and others
traceable to human error.263 More specifically, the disaster resulted from a
combination of the Buffalo River's rapid current, its seasonal ice flows, a
negligently moored vessel that worked itself loose from its moorings, the freeing
of two other vessels--one of which was struck and freed by the negligently moored
vessel-and the collision of these two adrift vessels with the negligently manned
city drawbridge.264 The events combined to dam the river,265 causing severe
upstream flooding.266 This flooding damaged warehouses and the goods stored
259. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (Kinsman 1); In re Kinsman Transit Co. v. City
of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (Kinsman 11).
260. Kinsman I, 338 F.2d at 711-12; see supra note 147 and accompanying text (restating the facts of
Kinsman 1).More specifically, Kinsman I involved defendants' appeals from an interlocutory decree in admiralty
that adjudicated liability. Kinsman I, 338 F.2d at 711. Upstream flooding caused the loss claimed by several
plaintiffs. Two plaintiffs were injured, several sustained damage to their ships, and the rest suffered flood damage.
All claims were for physical harms and any recoverable parasitic damages. The losses based on flooding were the
most difficult for the court in Kinsman L
261. Kinsman If 338 F.2d at 822; see supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing this case in detail).
262. Kinsman 11, 338 F.2d at 822. It was the inability of these shippers to go upstream to timely deliver grain
that caused the economic losses that were the subject of Kinsman . Id
263. Kinsman 1, 338 F.2d at 711-12.
264. Id.
265. Id. at712.
266. Id. at 713.
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inside.267 Of course, blocking the Buffalo River prevented ships moored
downstream from passing to upstream docks to deliver their cargo for
approximately two months following the disaster.26 The human errors that were
causes of this event included the negligent tying of the Shiras by Kinsman Transit
Company's dockhand, and the City of Buffalo employees' negligent failure to raise
the Michigan Avenue drawbridge.2 9
2. The Issues
Many maritime issues were involved in these appeals, but we are concerned
only with the duty questions.270 In reaching his Kinsman I decision, Judge Friendly
resorted to many sources. These included Palsgraf,27' a later Texas court
272 C7 7decision, a Second Circuit case,273 the Restatement (Second) of Torts,274 the
writings of several recognized tort authorities,275 and several English decisions.
276
He concluded that the defendant's dockman and the City's bridge tenders owed a
duty to those plaintiffs who sustained physical harm.277 This included those
claiming flood damage.278
Judge Kaufman denied recovery to the plaintiffs in Kinsman H.279 According
to that court, the economic losses suffered by the plaintiffs were simply too
remote.280
3. The Court's Reasoning
Judge Friendly's discussion highlighted the differences in analysis that courts
have described; the authorities cannot be reconciled. He concluded that
267. Id.
268. Kinsman 11, 388 F.2d at 822.
269. Kinsman 1, 338 F.2d at 712-13.
270. See id. at 713 (describing the complaints on appeal as numerous). Included were questions of the
availability of a limitation of liability for the shipowner and the effect of such limited liability on the liability of
the two non-limited joint tortfeasors. Id. at 714-16, 726-27.
271. 1l at 721-24 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)).
272. See id. at 721 (citing Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp., 124 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. 1939)).
273. Id. at 714 (citing The Anna C. Minch, 271 F. 192 (2d Cir. 1921)).
274. Id. at 718-19, 722.
275. Id. at 719 (citing HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs (1956), Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear
Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938), and Malcolm M. MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last
Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1940)).
276. See Kinsman 1, 338 F.2d at 723 (reviewing Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock &
Engineering Co. (The Wagon Mound), I All E.R. 404 (1961); Miller S.S. Co. v. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd.
(The Wagon Mound No. 2), 1 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 402 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W. 1963)).
277. Id. at 726-27.
278. ld. at 721-26.
279. Kinsman 11, 388 F.2d at 823.
280. ld. at 824.
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foreseeability of the harm may be used both to establish negligence and to define
the scope of the defendant's duty.28' As an example, apparently ignoring the
Palsgrafjury's finding that the defendant Long Island Railroad was negligent,282 he
would distinguish that case from the facts before him.283 To Judge Friendly, "the
appearance of the newspaper-wrapped package [in Palsgraf] gave no notice that its
dislodgement could do any harm."' "In contrast, a ship [negligently] moored in a
fast-flowing river is a known danger not only to [oneself] but to the owners of all
other ships and structures down river, and to any persons upon them."285 To him, the
eventual collapse of the bridge and the flooding of upstream property was
foreseeable.286
Fortifying his finding of duty, Judge Friendly noted that the "weight of
authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to [foreseeable]
consequences.., when the damages are 'direct.' 28 7 In such circumstances, it is
only important that the damage, although greater than expected (i.e., not
foreseeable), "is of the same general sort" as the damage that was foreseeable.288
Hence, even the arguably unforeseeable flood damage done to upstream property
was within the scope of these negligent defendants' liability. Thus, the damage was
"directly" imposed.28 9
To demonstrate his rule, Judge Friendly posed this hypothetical: suppose the
destruction of the Michigan Avenue bridge had delayed the arrival of a doctor,
consequently resulting in the loss of a patient's life.290 Would the negligent
defendants be subject to liability for this wrongful death? Judge Friendly would
answer, "No."29' Even though such an unfortunate happening was foreseeable, the
death of the patient is not a "direct" result. No further explanation was given.
In concluding his decision in Kinsman I, Judge Friendly acknowledged that
Judge Andrews' statement in Palsgraf that "'it is all a matter of expediency'
' 292
cannot be ignored. 293
281. Kinsman 1, 338 F.2d at 721-26.
282. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
283. Kinsman 1, 338 F.2d at 721-22.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 722.
286. Id. at 723. Judge Moore, dissenting on this point, thought that the majority's inclusion of upstream
flooding was stretching "foreseeability" beyond all reasonable or useful limits. Id. at 728 (Moore, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 724.
288. Id. The losses at issue fell within this extension of the rule-at least, that is what the majority held. No
more precise definition was given to test this conclusion. As shown, Judge Moore did not agree. See supra note
286 and accompanying text (displaying Judge Moore's disagreement on this topic).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 725.
291. Id.
292. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
293. Kinsman 1, 338 F.2d at 725 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting)).
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On the other hand, Kinsman II reflects the so-called "Economic Loss Rule,"
which holds that a negligent defendant is not legally responsible for economic
losses, because such claims are best left to contract law. In closing, Judge Kaufman
wrote:
In the final analysis, the circumlocution[,] whether posed in terms of
"foreseeability," "duty," "proximate cause," "remoteness," etc.[,] seems
unavoidable. ... [W]e return to Judge Andrews' frequently quoted
statement in [Palsgra]: "It is all a question expediency ...of fair
judgment, always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule
in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general
understanding of mankind."294
4. Application of Proposed Analysis Raises Questions
Should the negligent defendants be legally responsible for the physical harms
described in Kinsman I? Under the proposed analysis, the answer is probably,
"Yes"; the result is unchanged. Should the negligent defendants be legally
responsible for the economic losses sustained by the plaintiffs in Kinsman II? Under
the proposed analysis, the answer may be, "Yes."
The Kinsman I plaintiffs suffered negligently inflicted physical harms. Such
harms are favored over emotional or economic harms for purposes of awarding
damages. In addition, these property damage claims present rather routine
administrative issues. Causation is not questioned, and proof of ownership and
values should be quite simple.
Application of the economic factor is rather straightforward. If the owners of
the damaged property were insured against such harms, the first-party insurers
would have paid the owners without undue delay. Then the insurers would simply
assert their subrogation rights against the negligent parties. If the owners were not
insured, they would bring their own actions for their physical losses. In either case,
the losses would be shifted to parties who can spread the losses quite easily. Each
of these wrongdoers has liability insurance.
This brings us to consideration of deterrence, justice, and morality. Each factor
calls for recognition of a duty (i.e., the imposition of legal responsibility). The
wrong-doers will ultimately be responsible. This duty should heighten the
dockowners' safety efforts and remind the city of the need for the reasonable
conduct of its business. Deterrence of negligent conduct should result. Finally, there
seems to be something "good" about making wrongdoers pay for the harms they
effect. This argument utilizes the morality and justice factors.
294. Kinsman 11, 388 F.2d at 825 (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting)).
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Skipping through these basic considerations highlights the absence of guessing
as to the degree of foreseeability and whether the particular harms were "direct" or
"indirect," "proximate" or "remote." The lawyer will be forced to direct her
arguments to measurable matters.
Of course, there are a few administrative problems-the parties will dispute
whether such losses actually resulted, and there will be differences of opinion about
the value of such losses. Such issues, while manageable, are unavoidable when
economic claims are asserted.
The economic factor is the one that looms large. The plaintiffs cannot
distribute their losses through first-party insurance. Spreading the loss could be
difficult if the plaintiffs are to remain competitive. The price of the plaintiffs' goods
is determined by the market rather than by the seller. Therefore, economically, the
court should recognize a duty on the part of the negligent defendants. The morality
and justice factors add emphasis to such a result. The only impediment is the
continued reverence to the "Economic Loss Rule." Even so, that rule and the
supporting test of foreseeability seem weak. Perhaps a change is in order.
Again, from the Kinsman decisions, it is apparent that following the proposed
analysis has little to do with changing existing rules. Rather, the purpose is the
clarification of relevant considerations when dealing with the scope of a
wrongdoer's legal responsibility.
C. Long v. Turk
Simply put, Long v. Turkl 95 is a "negligent entrustment" case.296 Prior Kansas
decisions,297 decisions from across the country,298 and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts agree that one who owns or possesses a dangerous instrumentality has a
duty to safeguard others from its misuse. The duty question has been resolved when
harm results from such circumstances. This is analogous to Palsgraf, where the real
issue should have been identified and resolved. There was no duty question; it was
simply a question of fact to be resolved by a jury.
300
295. 962 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1998).
296. For a general discussion, see KEFON ET AL, supra note 49, § 33 n.70.
297. E.g., Wroth v. McKinney, 373 P.2d 216 (Kan. 1962).
298. E.g.,ince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103 (Vt. 1989).
299. RFsrATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTs §§ 388-390 (1977).
300. The Columbine High School tragedy in Littleton, Colorado, occurred while this Article was in draft
form. The negligent entrustment doctrine is quite relevant under the Colorado facts. What is the extent of the
gunmen's parents' liability? Will their homeowners' policies provide coverage if civil actions are brought?
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In Long v. Turk, the plaintiff mother brought suit against the father of a minor
who shot and killed her child.301 Her petition alleged that the father was responsible
for the death of her son because,
as the owner of the handgun . . . and/or ammunition used in [the]
shooting[,] . . . (a) He failed to properly secure the weapon and/or
ammunition; (b) He was negligent in his instruction of [his son] with
respect to the use of weapons; [and] (c) [Because] [h]e failed to take
adequate safeguards to keep [his son] away from both this gun and/or the
ammunition after [his son] had been apprehended with a sawed-off shotgun
in his possession.
The gun, loaded with hollow point bullets, was a .357 Magnum. 3 The trial court
granted the father's motion for summary judgment on the ground that, as a matter
of law, he could not have foreseen that the son would use the gun to commit a tort
against another. °4 The mother successfully appealed.0
The only real issue at the trial level was the question of negligence. On appeal,
the Kansas Supreme Court correctly noted that the evidence of the defendant
father's negligence was for the jury' ° Summary judgment for the defendant was
not in order. A factual determination was required to decide whether the steps the
father had taken to safeguard the gun had met with the degree of care required by
Kansas' "inherently dangerous instrument" rule, which the court found controlling
in this case.3°
The court described the issues as follows: (1) whether the "inherently dangerous
instrument" doctrine318 "require[s] an owner of a .357 Magnum handgun to exercise
the highest degree of care in safeguarding it;" and (2) whether the district court
erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant father.309 The court answered
both questions in the affirmative. t0 The court specifically refused to decide whether
the doctrine of inherently dangerous activity should apply to handgun owners;
301. Long v. Turk, 962 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Kan. 1998).
302. Id. at 1096.
303. Id. at 1094.
304. Id. at 1096.
305. Id at 1094.
306. Id. at 1099. Whether the risk of harm is reasonably foreseeable is for the jury to decide, unless
reasonable people could reach but one conclusion from the available evidence. Id
307. Id. at 1096.
308. "We have characterized certain instrumentalities, i.e., explosives, gas distribution systems, electrical
transmission lines, and firearms, to be inherently dangerous. Heightened care in their safekeeping is required."
Id. at 1097.
309. id. at 1094.
310. Id.
311. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND)OFToRrs §§ 519-520(1977).
312. Long, 962 P.2d at 1100.
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the question had not been raised in the lower court.3  Although speaking of
"proximate cause," the court correctly concluded that the doctrine of superseding
cause was not an available defense. 4
The court supported its recognition of liability for negligence by citing the
policy behind the State Legislature's enactment of criminal statutes governing the
safeguarding and possession of firearms.1 5 These criminal statutes lent support to
the holding that the father owed "the public a duty to store his .357 Magnum in a
safe and prudent manner."316 Whether this duty had been breached was a jury
question.
The negligent entrustment rule is supported by arguments that a court following
the proposed analysis would encounter. The rule creates no administrative
problems; it simply provides for yet another claim for damages for physical harm
based on a negligence theory. The economic factor is not clearly in favor of
liability. A question exists as to the availability of liability coverage to this
defendant father; some courts have held that the so-called "illegal acts" exclusion
in homeowners' insurance policies effectively denies coverage for the parent's
negligence.3 1 From a deterrence, justice, and morality point-of-view, the defendant
father's failure to carefully store such a lethal weapon warrants the imposition of
civil liability. Howeverwould a jury find this father negligent? Was there any way
the father could have prevented his child from using the gun? The answer depends
on which version of the facts the jury were to find credible.
D. J.S. v. R.T.H.
The New Jersey courts were faced with a tough duty question in the case of J.S.
v. R.TH.319 Even though the result seems sound, the analysis and reasoning of the
court is, in several respects, suspect. The court's misplaced concern with
foreseeability interferes with the clarity of the holding.
The plaintiff-parents brought this action on behalf of their daughters against
their neighbors (husband and wife), alleging that the defendant husband (John)
sexually assaulted their 12- and 15-year-old daughters, and that the defendant wife
(Mary) was negligent in failing to protect the daughters from John's sexual abuse.320
More particularly, in their amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Mary "was
313. Id.
314. Here, "proximate cause" appears to mean superseding cause; the intervening criminal act of the son
was foreseeable, and hence was not superseding. Id. Why can't proper labels be used by lawyers and judges?
315. Id. at 1098.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1099-1100.
318. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Roberts, 70 Cal. App. 4th 757 (1999). The facts are analogous to those
of Long v. Turk-no coverage for either the son or the parents.
319. 714 A.2d 924 (NJ. 1998).
320. Id. at 926.
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negligent in that she knew and/or should have known of her husband's
proclivities/propensities" and, as a result of her negligence, their two daughters
suffered physical and emotional injury.32 t
In defense, Mary denied she owed a duty to the plaintiffs.322 In addition, she
denied she was negligent.323 Finally, she contended that her actions (or inactions)
were not the "proximate cause"'3 24 of any harms sustained by the plaintiffs'
daughters-that any such harms were the result of actions by a third party (i.e.,
John), over whom she exercised no control.325 Mary then moved for summary
judgment,3 26 contending there was no legal basis for finding her negligent. 327 Her
motion was granted, and the appeals followed.328
The New Jersey Supreme Court correctly stated, "This case presents the issue
of whether a wife who suspects or should suspect her husband of actual or
prospective sexual abuse of their neighbors' children has any duty of care to prevent
such abuse. ' 329 The court continued: "Ultimately, the determination of the existence
of a duty is a question of fairness and public policy. In fixing the limits of liability
as a matter of public policy, courts must draw on 'notions of fairness, common
sense, and morality.' ' 330 This seems sound.
However, the court continued:
In determining whether a duty is to be imposed, courts must engage in a
rather complex analysis that weighs and balances several, related factors,
including the nature of the underlying risk of harm[:] that is, its
foreseeability and severity, the opportunity and ability to exercise care to
321. Id. at 926-27.
322. Id. at 927.
323. Id.
324. "Proximate cause" seems to refer to superseding cause under these facts. Id. at 935. Again, confusion
results. The court quotes from People Express Airlines, Inc., v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J.
1985), where duty seems to be under consideration, and then proceeds to the discussion regarding the need to
reject the imposition of liability for highly extraordinary consequences (e.g., unforeseeable consequences), as
under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 435(2) (1977), which deals with superseding causes. Superseding
causes are quite appropriate in third-party criminal activity cases.
325. Id. at 927.
326. More appropriately, Mary claimed she owed no duty. It seems clear that there was a jury question as
to her negligence. Whether her negligence, if any, was superseded by John's intentional tort presented another
fact question. Hence, summary judgment was not the proper motion. Note that most jurisdictions provide that the
trial judge may treat a motion forjudgment on the pleadings as a motion for summary judgment. E.g., FED. R. CIv.
P. 12(c).
327. J.S., 714 A.2d at 927. Mary's motion for summary judgment contended that there was "no legal basis
forfinding her negligent." Id. (emphasis added). What does this mean? The motion must have been treated as a
claim of "no duty"; a question of fact existed as to the wife's negligence.
328. Ajudgment was entered against the defendant husband. However, the plaintiffs' chances at recovering
anything from the husband are speculative at best. The husband and his wife have declared bankruptcy, and the
husband's intentional misconduct is not covered by their homeowners' policy. Id. at 927 n.2.
329. Id. at 926.
330. Id. at 928 (quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1118 (NJ. 1993)).
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prevent the harm, the comparative interests of, and the relationships
between or among, the parties, and, ultimately, based on considerations of
public policy and fairness, the societal interest in the proposed solution.33" '
Then the court stated, "Foreseeability of the risk of harm is the foundational
element in the determination of whether a duty exists."332
The inclusion of foreseeability seems endemic -many courts do consider it an
element basic to the analysis of the duty question. Why? The probability that
conduct will inflict harm on another is a consideration when testing for substandard
conduct (i.e., negligence). The scope of a negligent person's liability raises different
questions.
The essential question in the principle case was whether Mary owed a duty to
the neighbors' children if she knew of John's propensities. A related concern was
the cause question: was John's criminal conduct a superseding cause? If so, the
question of Mary's duty was moot. Of course, if Mary knew or should have known
of John's propensities, as alleged, John's criminal conduct was foreseeable and
therefore not a superseding cause.333 Thus, the court had to resolve Mary's duty
question.
When the risk of harm originates with a third person-John in this case-the
plaintiff must show that the defendant-here, Mary-knew or had reason to know
that the third person was likely to engage in conduct that would endanger the safety
of another.3 4 Of course, many facts must be weighed by the finder of fact in
deciding whether John's conduct was foreseeable to Mary. This court agreed that
the plaintiffs should have been allowed more time for discovery before the trial
judge considered Mary's motion for summary judgment. 35 In other words,
foreseeability is a fact question that must be fully developed before any conclusion
can be drawn from the record. Under these circumstances, summary judgment could
not be granted.
The court's concern in this appeal with Mary's knowledge seems misplaced.
Knowledge was alleged. That is all that matters when the duty question is before
the court. Mary's actual knowledge was just another fact question. If a jury were to
find that Mary knew or should have known of the risk to the plaintiffs' daughters,
then Mary had a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm.336
Whether such a duty existed is a question of law for the court. Therefore, the
discussions of the State's existing policy to protect children from sexual abuse, and
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 449 cmt. b (1977).
334. J.S., 714 A.2d at 928.
335. Id. at 936.
336. Id. at 935.
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the requirement that all report suspected child abuse, is quite relevant when
deciding the extent of Mary's duty.
337
To summarize, the real problems for lawyers involved in such cases are (1) the
duty issue, (2) the factual issue as to whether the non-intentionally tortious party
knew or should have known of the risk, and (3) the superseding cause question. The
factual issues are for a jury. The superseding cause question may involve a factual
issue (e.g., was it foreseeable that John would do such things?), but the duty issue
is one for the court. Under these allegations, the parties' lawyers will locate
decisions for and against the plaintiffs' contentions.33
A pre-trial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim339 is clearly in the
offing. Under the allegations, do the plaintiffs have a cause of action? This question
must be decided by the court. At the hearing, the lawyers and the judge should
focus on the factors listed in the proposed analysis. There are no insurmountable
administrative problems. The economic factors must be considered, but are they
determinative in this case? Mary's liability will be "covered," but John's cannot be
covered. The economic impact on the plaintiffs' children can be quite a burden.
Will the family's insurance cover the needed therapy? This will be a matter for the
parties to prove.
The morality and justice factors are significant, but the largest consideration is
deterrence. Will the recognition of a duty on the part of a spouse of an abuser
further encourage warnings? Criminal law seems to be rather ineffective in this
area. The point must be argued. The finding of a duty is definitely supportable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the suggested analysis, opinions confined to clearly defined issues are
"in," and conclusive, citation-filled opinions are "out." Clarity and reason will reign
in what remains of our judge-made common law.'
This analysis requires lawyers to argue intelligently; they can no longer guess
at what is or is not in the orbit of a judge's eye. Lawyers working from today's
judicial opinions cannot predict whether a judge will consider the negligent
337. See id. at 930-35 (discussing New Jersey's existing policy for protecting children from sexual abuse).
The court describes the State's recent legislation on the subject, and discusses decisions from other jurisdictions
that illustrate the existing public concern about such conduct.
338. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
339. This is, in effect, ajudgment entered as a matter of law.
340. Federal and state legislation are encountered with greater frequency. However, the common law still
controls most litigation. Our common law judges are empowered to "make law"; with the exception of one state,
Louisiana, we live in common law jurisdictions. Still, the best source for understanding this common law system
is ROSCOE POUND &THEODOREF. T. PLUCKNE T, READINGS ON THEHISTORY AND SYSTEM OFTHECOMMON LAW
(3d ed. 1927). Many of us should review this classic. Too often we read opinions that proclaim judges are not to
make law but to apply it; legislation is for the legislature, etc. "Activist" judges are bad! We must recognize the
importance of both stare decisis and the need for "growth"; the law must fairly reflect society's constantly
developing needs.
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defendant to be subject to liability or not. Using the proposed analysis, a lawyer will
be more accurate; she must consider the economics of the liability question rather
than guess at foreseeability, she must know the strengths and weaknesses of her
policy position, and she cannot argue proximate cause. She will argue the
deterrence effect, if any, of a proposed duty, and she will argue that her proposed
solution is "just" and "moral." The more objective nature of the arguments will
enable participants to predict with greater accuracy the court's reaction to duty
questions.
There is a vast reservoir of "liability law." Until questioned, the rules implicit
in liability law are assumed to reflect existing notions of society as to what the
nature and extent of a negligent person's liability should be. When an existing rule
is questioned, a rational approach will be in place; efficiency will prevail. Lawyers
and judges will proceed in a predictable and workable fashion. Using the proposed
analysis, lawyers and judges will clearly identify those cases that must go to a
jury,"4 and those that actually involve questions of law.342 Predictability will wield
its power over those who might otherwise threaten the courts with frivolous claims.
Again, this author submits that the only qualities that lawyers, judges, and
insurance companies desire from tort law are fairness, effectiveness, and certainty.
Under the proposed analysis, each of these goals can be achieved. We must resort
to reason and forget "foresight," "neighbors," and similar conclusive labels. As
Judge Andrews wrote, "[W]e endeavor to make a rule.., that will be practical and
in keeping with the general understanding of mankind.
'3 43
341. Such cases are for settlement. When lawyers cannot agree (often because of stubborn clients), resort
may be had to alternative dispute resolution methods. Trials before juries should be the last resort.
342. In these cases, the existing law is being challenged. Again, a jury trial is not required. Such duty
questions are handled in a reasoned proceeding. The resulting ruling should reflect full consideration of all
relevant factors.
343. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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FROM BABEL TO REASON, APPENDIX
Babel still reigns in California negligence law. Justice Baxter's majority
opinion in the recent case of Sharon R v. Arman, Ltd.' is the most recent example.
The plaintiff/tenant was attacked and sexually assaulted at gunpoint in the
subterranean garage of defendant/landlord's office building. She brought a
negligence action against the landlord/owner and the operators of the building's
parking garage.2 Then the Babel began: the defendants filed motions for summary
judgment The evidence submitted by the parties is summarized in the opinion.4
These motions were granted by the trial judge.5 Plaintiff appealed.
A majority of the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision; the
negligence of the defendants was a question for the jury.6 The California Supreme
Court granted hearing on June 25, 1997. The Supreme Court's decision is dated
December 16, 1999. It took more than six years to resolve this simple but most
important negligence action. And what is the law now? Babel brings about
unnecessary delays and creates continued confusion.
Think about it. All the participating judges and lawyers in this latest example
agreed that Sharon P. had to establish defendants' duty, the breach or breaches of
that duty, and a causal relationship between that negligence and her harm.7 It was
acknowledged that the defendants must maintain the garage in a reasonably safe
condition; owners and occupiers have the duty to take reasonable steps to secure
common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.8
These agreed principles gave the parties' lawyers all they needed to resolve this
case. There was no duty question. However, there were breach (negligence) and
cause questions. Was there sufficient evidence to "get to the jury" on each of these
issues? If so, clear-headed lawyers would talk settlement and, if that didn't work,
go to trial. Summary judgment for the defendants was possible only if the
undisputed evidence forced the conclusion that the defendants had exercised due
care.
It is likely that most of you would consider this a case "for the jury." Instead,
all of the defendants' lawyers (including Amicus Curiae) and thejudges (exception:
Justice Mosk) believed either: (1) that no reasonable jury could find negligence
1. 21 Cal. 4th 1181 (Cal. 1999).
2. She alleged the defendants' failure to provide adequate security (e.g., poor lighting, unused security
cameras, and no inspection or monitoring of the parking area). Id. at 1185-86.
3. Compare a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (i.e., a demurrer in California state
courts).
4. See, e.g., Sharon P., 21 Cal. 4th at 1185-87.
5. Neither of the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff to make the garage more secure because the
attack was not reasonably foreseeable. l at 1187.
6. Id at 1187.
7. Id at 1188.
8. Id. at 1189.
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under the facts disclosed at the summary judgment stage of the case; or (2) that the
highly touted "foreseeability" element of the duty question was factually for them
to decide.9
Using such beliefs as their foundation, the majority held:10 (1) that a sexual
assault was not sufficiently foreseeable to support the requirement that defendants
secure that area against crime; and (2) that absent prior similar incidents of violent
criminal assaults in the garage, defendants were not required to provide lighting,
security cameras or walk-throughs by personnel.11 Having proclaimed these truths,
the majority remanded the case with directions to enter judgment in favor of the
defendants.' 2
It is this author's opinion that every lawyer and judge in California who is
involved or even interested in negligence law should very carefully read the
dissenting opinion of Justice Mosk.13 In fact, I suggest that you make a copy of his
dissent to carry with you at all times. Clear understanding is reflected in his well
chosen words.
Justice Mosk recognizes that the word "foreseeable" is usually included as an
element in both the duty and breach questions. 14 Therefore, he cautions us about the
different meanings of the word. When deciding if particular conduct is negligent,
one considers all reasonably foreseeable risks and compares such risks with the
resulting costs. 5 On the other hand, if foreseeability is considered an element when
duty is an issue, we revert to the now-antiquated notion of "proximate cause." 16
Simply put, is the plaintiffs harm too remote from the defendant's negligence?
This is a question of law. Unfortunately, the remoteness issue did not exist in
Sharon p. 7 Work on it!
In conclusion, we must simplify and clarify our use of existing law, or pressure
for tort reform will build. We have a very fair and workable system when those
involved proceed properly. Lawyers must first identify the true issue(s) in each case
(e.g., breach?). Second, when the issue is the extent of a negligent person's liability
(i.e., duty), the judges must use a factoring approach omitting the 'foreseeable'
9. The California Supreme Court justices properly rejected the appellate court's notion that all
underground parking structures are "inherently dangerous." Id. at 1191.
10. Being more precise, it seems they "found" that the attack was not foreseeable rather than that they
"held" it was foreseeable. Or did they establish a new rule of law?
11. Sharon P., 21 Cal. 4th at 1196.
12. l. at 1199.
13. Id. at 1202-10.
14. Id at 1205-06.
15. An example is the algebraic approach described by L. Hand in Carroll Towing Co. v. United States,
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Careful predictions must be made when resolving negligence questions.
16. Today we speak of "legal cause." Compare the still popular but misleading label "proximate cause"
in this connection. See Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1999), and footnotes 129 and 134 in the main
body of this Article. As a matter of law, Sharon P.'s harms were not "too remote," even though an unknown
assailant was involved. Such a defense was never raised.
17. Sharon P., 21 Cal. 4th at 1205-09.
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element; foreseeability is an important element when the negligence/breach
question is involved, but should never be a part of the analysis when the court is
faced with a duty question. It is this dual usage that has led so many lawyers and
judges astray. We must stop the Babel and get back on the beaten paths to efficient
justice.
